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iiEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unemployment  and job creation  are critical policy issues  in both  OECD  and  transition
countries.  This  study  examines  one  type  of intervention  that  is  often  used to  quickly
create jobs:  Public Service Employment  programs.  Such programs  are characterized by
the employment of unemployed persons, financed by the government, to provide services or
infrastructure  (public  works).  Specifically,  this  study  examines  public  employment
programs  in Denmark,  France,  Germany, Hungary.  Spain, Poland,  the United  Kingdom
and the United States, with some additional data from the Czech Republic.
The PSE programs reviewed in this study are under the overall responsibility  of national
ministries  (typically  Ministries  of  Labor).  Actual  program  administration  is  usually
delegated to  the regional  or local  level, typically  to  local labor  offices,  which  develop
sub-project  contracts with local service providers which receive  financing  to implement
the agreed  PSE  programs. These  contracts  usually  involve  county,  municipal,  and  city
governments,  and  increasingly  private  sector,  non-profit  organizations,  which  hire the
unemployed  to provide local services.  However, job creation  and public works may not
be fally compatible objectives, in that PSE jobs may displace  existing jobs, particularly if
the PSE jobs are truly useful.  To reduce such displacement and increase net job creation,
many  programs  are therefore  designed  to carry out marginal  tasks  or set limits  on the
duration of a post.
Most  PSE  programs  succeed  in targeting long-term  unemployed  older  workers,  or else
young inexperienced workers.  Since many programs focus on manual work, they tend to
have a high majority of male participants.  Thus, if gender issues are of concern  the type
of work activity that is financed through PSE programs must be carefully considered and
broadened.  One  objective of PSE  programs  is to  provide  training  for  the  unskilled  to
improve their employability.  However, the work activity undertaken  in PSE programs is,
most  often, unskilled.  As a result, it is not clear that this  objective  is being  met by  the
programs.
There  is evidence in some countries that  local authorities reduce  their welfare  program
burden by churning people through nationally  funded PSE  programs.  The net impact of
PSE programs on employment  is, on the whole, uncertain.  On the one hand, surveys of
participants  show that many  successfully  find non-subsidized  employment  after leaving
the programs.  On the other hand, if the employment histories of program  participants is
compared with those of demographically  similar non-participants,  the evidence suggests,
somewhat  surprisingly, that participation  in PSE  programs  may  significantly  lower  the
chances  of finding  non-subsidized  employment.  These types  of measurements  are not
often  undertaken  as to  do  so  requires  a  study  that  randomly  places  people  in  a  PSE
program  or  in  a  control  group,  or  use  of  quasi-experimental  design  techniques  were
similar participants and non-participants are compared.
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ivIPUBLIC  SERVICE  EMPLOYMENT
I.  INTRODUCTION
1.1  Job creation in the context of persistently  high levels of unemployment continues to
be a priority item among OECD member countries.  Unemployment  is also an issue at the top
of the policy agenda in several Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), where GDP
has  fallen  sharply  as  their  economies  make  the  transition  to  a  market  basis.  In  these
countries, it is not uncommon  to see regional  unemployment  rates in the double-digit  range.
The  debate  about  how  to  combat  unemployment  and  create jobs  continues.  One  set  of
arguments  emphasizes  flexible  labor  and  product  markets,  deregulation,  anti-trust  policies,
cutting  interest  rates  to  spur  economic  growth,  and  increasing  openness  to  the  global
economy.  In this  view, governments  should not intervene  directly in the labor market, but
rather  focus  on policies  that  create  conditions  that  will  allow job  creation to  occur  in the
private  market.  Others  fear  that  increased  taxes,  public  spending  cuts  and  other  tough
austerity  measures  will  aggravate  the  jobs  crisis  to  the  point  where  there  is  a  political
backlash,  and  argue  that  there  is  a  place  for  short-term  public  intervention  in  the  labor
market,  and  a need  to finance  programs  to  help  workers  adjust  to changing  labor  market
conditions.  There  is evidence,  as seen  in many CEEC  countries.  of a political backlash  if
individuals  are not persuaded  that the " short term pain"  of economic transition will result in
"long  term gain"  and if they  do not see evidence of a  safety net to assist them through the
transition period.
1.2  This paper examines  one type  of program that  is used by many OECD  and CEEC
countries  to ease  the  pain  of structural  adjustment  and  create jobs,  namely  Public  Service
Employment  (PSE).  Such  programs  are  characterized by  the employment  of unemployed
persons,  financed  by  the  government,  to  provide  services  and/or  support  infrastructure
development  (public works).  Many  of those  in the  "non  interventionist"  camp  view these
programs  as  a  waste  of  public  funds  that  could  be  used  in  more  productive  economicinvestments.  Some  of those  in  the  "interventionist  camp"  also  view  the  programs  in  a
similar manner  and feel that,  while some intervention  is needed,  PSE  programs  are not an
appropriate tool.  However, a number of OECD and CEEC countries are implementing  such
programs.  The objective of this report study is to review and summarize the experience that
several countries have had with these programs.
Table 1.1:
Programs Studied
Year  Number of
Program  created  participants 1994
Denmark  Job Offer Scheme  1978  45 000
France  Contrats emploi solidarite  1990  715 000'
Gennany  ABM Scheme  1969  252 000
Spain  Instituto Nacional de Emploeo Agreements  1985  176 0002
UK  Community Action  1993  50 000
USA  Public Service Employment  1972  694 0003
Poland  Public Works for the Unemployed  1991  110 000
Hungary  Public Employment Program  1991  70 000
1.  Of these participants,  one third have had their participation  extended.
2.  Number  of participants  in 1993
3.  Number  of participants  in 1980.
Source:  Data provided by the national authorities.
1.3.  Table  1.1  details  the  countries  and  programs  examined'.  The  countries  and
programs  selected  are  not  a  representative  sample:  some  were  included  because  program
infornation  was  readily  available;  others,  such  as Denmark,  France  and  Germany,  were
included because these countries  have heavily emphasized the use of such programmes;  the
American  programme,  which was discontinued over  15 years ago, remains relevant  because
this  is  where  some  of  the  best  research  has  been  conducted;  Hungary  and  Poland  are
included because of their obvious relevance to the situation of countries in transition.
The following text contain  summary  level data and analysis, additional detail is contained  in the Annexes.II.  ACTIVE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
2.1  The OECD Jobs Study  concluded that  much of the persistent unemployment  in its
member  countries  is structural.  The same trend  is emerging  in  many  CEECs.  Structural
unemployment  arises, in part, due to changes in the demand for labor.  Key changes include a
substantial shift in demand towards more highly skilled occupations and away from unskilled
manual  work,  and  a  shift  from  production  to  service  jobs  (particularly  in  transition
economies).  The OECD study recommended active employment policies which mobilize the
labor  force, provide  the unemployed  with better  skills and which promote  active  search for
work.  Active  labor  policies  can be  divided  into  five  program  cdtegories':  employment
services such as placement  and counseling services, which address  frictional unemployment
and are used as a screening device for other programs;  adult labor market training and youth
training,  which address  structural unemployment;  measures  for the disabled;  and subsidized
employment  programs.  which  address the lack of demand  for labor.  PSE programs  form a
part of subsidized emplovment  programs along with subsidies to regular employment  in the
private sector and self-employment programs.
Table 2.1:
Participant inflows in selected labor market programs, 1994
(per cent of labor force)
Labor  market  Youth  Subsidies  to  Public  service employment
Training  training  private sector'
Denmark  12.0  1.8  0.1  1.1
France&  4.8  3.1  0.5  1.7
Germany  1.9  0.6  0.2  1.0
Spain  0.7  0.2  0.1  0.8
UK 3 0.9  0.5  ..  0.1
Hungary  1.  ..  1.6  1.2
Poland  0.5  1.5  1.2  0.6
1.  Wage subsidies TO  Ithe private sector for the recruitment of unemployed workers or, in some cases, for
continued emplo\ mint of person whose  jobs are at risk.
2.  Data is for 199-.
3.  Data is for 1993-1994
Source: OECD ( ]995) Emplo.nernt  Outlook.  Tables T and U, pp.  222-230.
2.2  Current data indicate that PSE programs are smaller than the public works programs
implemented  during  the  Depression  era  yet  they  remain  important  alongside  other  active
3employment  programs.  Table 2.1 shows the participation  inflows as a per  cent of the labor
force  into  selected  labor  market  programs.  PSE  programs  tend  to  be  smaller  than  labor
market training programs in most of the countries in this study's  sample yet larger than wage
subsidy programs targeted at private sector firms.  The PSE program was highest  in France,
as 1.7 per  cent of the  labor force had  been routed  into the program.  The PSE programs  in
Denmark, Germany and Spain absorb approximately  1 per cent of the labor force.  As a flow,
this  has amounted  to  over  700 000 persons  in  1994 and the  American  program  employed
close to half a million people before it was phased out in 1982
2.3  The  policy  mix  in  Poland  and  Hungary  is  slightly  different  with  the  participant
inflows  into programs,  which subsidize  private  employment  being greater  than inflows  into
PSE programs.  Also, PSE programs absorb about as many of the unemployed as do training
programs.  This  is  in  contrast  to  OECD  countries,  where  training  programs  tend  to  be
relatively  large.  A  recent  OECD  study  has  remarked  that  the  policy  mix  in Poland  and
Hungary is changing2,  and there seems to be a trend towards  a gradual  expansion of training
programs which may reflect the institution-building  that is currently in progress.  Inflows into
public work schemes have  increased largely due to the spread  of long-term  unemployment.
and the fact that increasing numbers  of the unemployed  have  exhausted  their unemployment
insurance benefits.
III.  OBJECTIVES  OF  PSE PROGRAMS
3.1  PSE programs  may have multiple objectives, and in practice they vary from country
to country  and  over time.  Programs  may  seek to  maintain  or increase  incomes,  to absorb
cyclical unemployment,  to draw  discouraged and  long-term-unemployed  workers back  into
the labor  force by providing  work  experience  or training.  Virtually  by  definition,  all PSE
programs  have an objective  of providing public  services  of some sort.  It is not uncommon
for one PSE program to have several objectives.  Nor is it uncommon for the different  levels
of  government  involved  in  the  program's  implementation  to  have  different  priority
objectives.
43.2  Broadly  speaking,  some objectives  can be described  as counter-cyclical  and  others
as structural.  For  example,  in OECD  countries  PSE  programs  were  traditionally  counter-
cyclical  employment  policy,  with  attention  focused  on  employing  the  jobless  during
recessionary  periods.  The UK 3 Community  Action  program  was  originally  envisaged  as
having  a relatively  short  life  span.  It  was introduced  in  1993, when  unemployment  was
relatively  high, and  was phased  out in 1996 as declining  unemployment  has rendered it no
longer necessary.
3.3  PSE programs with the objective of reducing structural unemployment  have become
more  common  with  the  rise  of persistent  unemployment  levels.  PSE  programs  designed
solely  to  reduce  cyclical  unemployment  are  not  well  adapted  to  dealing  with  long-term
structural unemployment,  because  of the risk that those employed  in the programs will never
be able to leave them.  This consideration  has led governments  to adjust program design to
make PSE  programs  more  active  by providing  assistance  which  helps workers  to  improve
their employability.  The program  in France  seeks to draw the very long-term  unemployed,
who are at high risk of becoming  discouraged and dropping  out of the work-force,  back into
searching for a job or obtaining new skills.  The participants  are placed in jobs which provide
them  with  work  experience  and  counseling,  and  a mentor  or tutor  is  assigned  to  provide
assistance  with  finding  a new job.  Another  way to  attack  structural  unemployment  is to
include training as part of the PSE program.  The US program,  which was initially meant to
fight cyclical unemployment,  was modified by the addition  of a training component  in order
to reduce  structural unemployment.  In the New  Lander in Germany  similar  concerns have
been expressed, that more training needs to be introduced into the traditional PSE program.
3.4  A  recent  objective  proposed  for  PSE  programs  is  to  provide  a  disincentive  for
people to collect social assistance, rather than finding a job,  by requiring them to work for the
assistance benefits.  This is often referred to as '"workfare."  This has been one focus of the
current  US welfare  reform  debate.  Similar  reforms  are  being  investigated  in  the  United
Kingdom,  where  a pilot  project,  "Project  Work,"  has  recently  been  introduced  for people
who have been unemployed  for 2 years or more.  Following  an interview, clients are offered
5help  through  extra  advisory  interviews,  but if they are still unemployed  after another three
months, they will be directed to attend a work project for 13 weeks, and their social benefits
will  be partly  withdrawn  if they  refuse  to  attend.  Hungary  has just  introduced  a  similar
scheme.
3.5  The objectives  of the local and regional  governments,  which participate  in the PSE
programs  by organizing  work activity and hiring the participants, may be different from those
of the  national  authorities.  Most  national  governments,  which  finance  PSE programs,  are
primarily  concerned  with the  unemployed,  and their first objective  is, therefore,  to employ
the jobless  in the  short term and hopefully  move them  into unsubsidized  employment  in the
long term.  Of secondary concern is the provision of goods and services.  On the whole, while
local  and  regional  authorities  are  sympathetic  to  national  objectives  of  reducing
unemployment  and  poverty,  they  tend  to  view  the provision  of  goods  and  services  as  a
priority.  Indeed,  as part of the  current trend  towards  decentralized  government,  local and
regional  authorities are finding themselves  responsible for providing  more services with little
or no increased revenue to do so.
3.6  The objectives  of PSE programs  in Central and Eastern Europe  are similar to those
in OECD  countries.  Currently,  most CEEC programs tend  to be  cyclical or "transitional".
and  are  viewed  as a  response  to  the  unemployment  that  has  resulted  from  the  necessary
restructuring  of  the  economies  and  the  privatization  of  state-owned  enterprises.  In  both
Poland  and HunLarN  - the two countries examined in this study, many of the participants had
exhausted  their  unemployment  insurance  benefits,  and  the programs  are seen as providing
income  support  to  f-amilies.  By  contrast,  structural  policies,  such  as training,  were not  a
stated objective  of the programs.  Similar to experiments  in OECD  countries,  Hungary has
recentlv  introduced  compulsory  PSE participation  for recipients  of social welfare benefits in
an effort to contain  Lroxviwm  social welfare  costs  and in response  to  concerns that many  of
those receiving social wNelfare  benefits may be emploved in the informal economy.
3.7  Although  initially  most  of  the  unemployment  problems  were  attributed  to  the
transitional  nature  of  the  economies  of  Hungary  and  Poland,  it is  increasingly  being
6recognized  that a more permanent,  structural  unemployment  problem  is arising,  as it has in
many  OECD countries.  As such the authorities  in transition  economies  are beginning to re-
evaluate  the  nature  of their  programns to  emphasize  structural  factors.  The  lessons  from
OECD  countries  and  selected  CEECs,  which  are  discussed  in  the  following  paragraphs,
should be helpful in guiding PSE policy formation in other transition economies.
IV.  PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS, WORK ACTIVITY  AND PROVIDERS
4.1  Program participants.  Governments  most often create regulations  to  "target"  PSE
programs  at those  for whom it is most difficult  to find a job and, to this  end, provide local
officials  administering  the  programs,  usually  local  labor  offices,  with  directives  on  which
groups  are eligible  for the program.  For example,  in Germany,  the program  is open to the
unemployed  who are either younger  than 25  or older than  50, and  to workers  aged between
25 and 50 who have been unemployed for at least 6 months of the previous  12.  This reflects
the judgement  that  youth, older  workers  and  the  long-term  unemployed  are particularly  in
need  of help.  In the United  Kingdom,  the  program  is open  only to  those who  have been
unemployed for  12 months or more.  In the United  States, the program operated  only in areas
of high  unemployment,  although  it was  reformed  several  times,  with  the  last  arnendment
requiring that the participants be unemployed  15 of the previous  20 weeks, and have a family
income below a specified amount or be a member  of a family receiving public assistance.  In
Poland, the programs are meant to assist the long-term unemployed  and, in practice, they are
presented  to  those  who  have  exhausted  their  unemployment  insurance  benefits,  to  single
parents and to low-income families.
4.2  The directives set by Government  Ministries are often only guidelines and in many
cases local labor offices may be allowed to admit other participants  if they  see fit.  Flexible
directives  make  for  more  manageable  programs  that  can  be  tuned  to  local  labor  market
conditions.  Administrative  data can give a rough  indication  of the groups that have, in fact,
been admitted to the programs, as compared to those who had been targeted.  In Germany, a
study in  1989 showed that 84 per  cent of the participants  were among the groups which  the
7national ministry sought to target. 4 In the United Kingdom, targeting directives appear to have
been  particularly  binding,  with  98  per  cent  of the  participants  being  among  the  long-term
unemployed,  the  ministry's  target  group.  There are no  program  data available  for  Poland,
although a recent study suggests that those formerly employed as public administrators have a
greater probability of participating in the program. 5 This would be poor targeting if it could be
shown that they were not among the long-term unemployed, and if, as the authors suggest, the
local  labor  office  staff  tend  to  sympathize  with  other  (former) public  administrators.  In
Hungary, another  recent  study has  shown that, although most participants are unskilled men,
people  with  higher-education  qualifications  are  over-represented in the  program which  may
suggest  that  current selection practices could  be improved to more  effectively  targeting the
unemployed with the greatest difficulty of finding a job6
4.3  Program  data also  revealed that  PSE participants  tend  to be unskilled.  In France,
one-quarter  of  the  participants  are  unqualified  workman  and  another  30  per  cent  had
previously  been  in low-skilled  clerical  or service employment;  in the United  Kingdom,  40
per cent were characterized  as having  little or no qualifications,  with 80 per  cent having  left
school  before the  age of  16 or earlier; over  65 per  cent of the  participants  in Hungary  are
unskilled;  program data from Poland show that over 60 per  cent of participants  have only a
basic  education  (up  to  8 years  of  schooling);  and  in  Germany  more  than  60  per  cent of
participants  in  programs  in the old Lander  had  no  vocational  training  (in the new  Lander,
however, only 5.8 per cent of the participants had no vocational training and more than  50%
were skilled workers).
4.4  Work activity.  The work  activity  undertaken  in PSE programs  is also, most often,
unskilled, in part to enable programs to be extended quickly to a large number of participants
who  themselves  tend  to  be unskilled.  In  addition,  costs  can  be held  down  because  the
preparation  of participants  for the work need  not be too lengthy  and supervising  them  need
not be  complex.  In  some  countries,  limited  duration.  entr;-level  jobs  was  a requirement
imposed by labor unions protecting their members from being displaced by PSE participants.
The manual  labor involved  in cleaning or painting a municipal  building or collecting rubbish
8along the motor-way  fits the bill, as do simple clerical tasks  which  can be carried out in an
office or the cleaning chores and patient care undertaken in a retirement home.
4.5  The  type  of  work  which  is  created  in  the  programs  influences  the  relative
participation rates of males  and females.  Programs that focus on public works, which involve
manual  labor,  tend  to  have  a  higher  proportion  of male  participants,  whereas  those  that
supply social services (an increasing area of interest in several countries) have a higher share
of female participants.  In the United  Kingdom, much of the work which  is created in PSE
programs is in environmental  clean-up  or community improvements,  both of which involve
manual labor, and, as a result, 80 per cent of the participants are male.  In contrast, the French
program tends to create work activity  in educational  services and  social care activities,  and
over  60  per  cent of the  participants  are female.  Data  on  gender  in  Poland  and  Hungary
showed that  over  70 per  cent  of participants  were  male, again  reflecting  the nature  of the
work, which was largely manual labor in maintaining local infrastructure.  Authorities  in the
local labor office in Poznan,  Poland reported that female  participation  was on the increase,
however,  as more work activities  were being organized in the social care area.  In Hungary,
work  activity  was also  primarily  manual  in the  early  stages  of the  program,  yet  recently
participants are being employed in other positions: social services, health care, public education
and monument protection.'
4.6  Program  administration  and program  providers.  The PSE  programs  reviewed  in
this  study-are  under the  overall responsibility  of national ministries  (typically Ministries  of
Labor).  Actual  program  administration  is usually  delegated to  the regional  or local  level,
typically  to  local  labor  offices,  which  develop  sub-project  contracts  with  local  service
providers which  receive  financing to  implement the agreed  PSE programs.  These contracts
usually  involve  county,  municipal,  and  city governments,  and  increasingly  private  sector,
non-profit  organizations  which  hire the unemployed to provide  local services. For example,
in Germany,  Spain and the United  Kingdom, the regional  labor office calls for tenders from
the regional,  local authorities  to organize  (or sponsor)  a work  activity  for the  unemployed.
Various bids describing the work activity and the number of workers needed are reviewed by
9the labor office which then  selects those that are deemed suitable.  In France, the employer
enters into a contract with  an unemployed  candidate and  with the  regional  labor office.  In
Hungary and Poland, the local labor offices co-operate  most often with the Mayor's  Office,
as well as private, non-profits,  to organize work activity for the participants.
4.7  Most  programs  require  that  the  work  created  should  not  be  profit-oriented  but
instead  serve the  general  public  welfare.  Private  enterprises,  therefore,  are  generally  not
eligible unless they are delivering goods and services under contract to the public sector.
Table 4.1: Providers
(per cent)
Local  and regional  Other  government  Non-profit
authorities'  agencies 2 organizations
France  27  34  36
Germany  39  29  32
UK  8  3  71
USA  39  27  34
1.  Local  and regional  governments  administrations.
2.  Local  and regional branches of national ministries. IN Germnany,  this includes Treuhand enterprises and
ABS enterprises.
Source: Data  provided  by the national authorities. For more information,  see country-specific  annexes.
4.8  There are essentially  3 broad types of program providers  who sponsor work activity
for  PSE  participants:  local  and  regional  authorities,  such as  the  Mayor's  office  and  the
various departments of its general administration;  the local and regional branches of national
ministries,  such as the  Ministry  of the  Environment  or Ministries  of Social  Welfare;  and
private, non-profit bodies, mostly charity and volunteer work  in the social care field.  France
and Germany have a roughly equal distribution  of sponsors across these three  groups, (Table
4.1).  By contrast,  the  United  Kingdom  relies  heavily  on  charitable  and  other  non-profit
bodies.  The participation  of private  sector,  non-profit  organizations  in PSE  programs  is a
recent  phenomenon,  perhaps  reflecting  the  trend  among  many  local  and  regional
governments to contract-out local services to private sector.  No program data were available
in  this  respect  for  Poland  and  Hungary,  although  discussions  with  ministry  authorities
revealed  that  private,  non  profit  organizations  have  played  a  very  minor  role  in  their
10programs.  The primary  reason  for  the  initial  lack of  private  non-profit  participation  was
because there were relatively few of them,  initial programs tended to focus on public works
which private non-profits  were not involved  in, and until recently  contracting-out  services
has been  an unfamiliar  procedure.  However,  there  are examples  in  Hungary  where  local
governments are creating separate " non-profit"  entities to deliver services using PSE funds.
V.  IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
5.1  Displacement  effects.  PSE jobs  may  simply  displace  other  workers  because  the
program provides a service that had been provided by an existing  supplier, PSE  participants
replace others who are  working, or in some cases existing workers are terminated  and simply
rehired under the PSE program.  Governments are attempting to implement programs in ways
that limit this displacement effect, as summarized  in Table 5. 1, because it tends to reduce the
net  number  of jobs  created  and  displacement  may  create  an  adverse  reaction  with  labor
representatives, particularly in times of high unemployment.
5.2  Many  programs,  including  those  in  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United
States, prohibit PSE activity from competing directly with private enterprise.  The use of PSE
financing  for  existing  government  activities  is also  often  prohibited,  in order  to  limit  the
practice  of  firing  government  workers  and  re-hiring  them  in  the  PSE  program.  Such  a
practice  can also  be discouraged  by  limiting  the duration  of the  work activity,  since by  so
doing government agencies cannot  count on PSE program  funding for routine activities  that
would necessarily extend beyond the allowable duration.  In France, Germany and the United
States,  work activity  is organized for  12 months, although  in all three  countries this  can be
extended  in some circumstances.  PSE  wage policies can also influence  displacement.  For
example,  programs  in Germany  and Denrnark require  that PSE  participants  receive  wages
similar to  those stipulated  in collective  agreements,  which  tends  to  draw  participants  into
PSE programs, but may also exacerbate displacement.  In the United  States, by contrast, PSE
l lwages  were fixed at  a low level in order to  limited the ability  of local governments  to use
PSE funds to hire skilled employees to perform normal city functions.
Table 5.1:
Displacement:  Limits on PSE programs,  1994
Maximum  duration of work activity  Other requirements
Denmark  3 years  Must  pay  minimum  or union  wages
France  12 months with possibilitv  of 24 months  Public  or non-profit  work  activity  only
extension
Germany  12 months with possibility  of more than  Must  pay  union  wages
one 12  month  extension
Spain  12  months
UK  12  months  with  possibility  of renewal  Must  not  compete  with  private  sector  activity
USA  12-18  months  Must be entry level job. must pay comparable  wages,
must  not compete  with  private  sector  public  or non-profit
Hungary  12  months
Poland  12 months  ..
Source:  Data  provided  by the national  authorities.  For more  information,  see countrv-specific  annexes.
5.3)  The current study has attempted to collect qualitative research-based information  on
job displacement,  and evidence was located for Hungary and the United States.  In Hungary,
the providers  of work  activity  in two  counties  were surveyed  in  1992 and  1993.8  It was
found that  12 per  cent of the providers  reported  hiring participants  to do work that had  been
previously done by non-subsidized  workers, and  12 per cent of the respondents also said that
the number of non-subsidized  workers on their staff had been reduced.  A significant number
also  said that the work  activity  would have  been  contracted  out to the private  sector in the
absence  of the PSE  program.  The survey  is too small to  provide  accurate  estimates  but it
does point to the existence  of a displacement  effect on workers in both the private and public
sector.
5.4  In the US program, an evaluation was carried out using a longitudinal field evaluation of
several local governments and their  implementation of the  PSE  programs was undertaken and
supplemented  with an analysis of several other program providers who subcontracted  positions from
the local government. The evaluation defined the hiring of a PSE worker as net job creation if the
worker was involved in new programs and services; in special "one-time" projects; in programs that
were expanded; or were providing services that would have been curtailed in the absence of the PSE
program. PSE workers who were judged to have  displaced other  workers were those  who  had
12been  transferred  from  existing  regional  and  local  government  positions  to  PSE  funding;  had  been
government  employees;  had  been  laid off and  re-hired  with PSE funding;  had  provided  services  or
worked  on projects that were formerly  contracted to outside  organizations or private firms; or were  in
jobs  that would  otherwise  have been funded with other  revenue 9 . (The study undertaken in Poland'°,
mentioned  previously  in  paragraph  16,  which  found  an  over-representation  of  former  public
administrators  participating, in the  program  could, perhaps,  be  explained  by the  firing  and  re-hiring
workers in order to take advantage of program funding).  Table 5.2 summarizes the  information  on job
creation  and  displacement  from  the US program.  The  data  indicate that  a high  proportion  of  PSE
funds resulted  in net job  creation, mainly in terms of program  maintenance and  expansion of existing
services.
Table  5:2:
Distribution  of Employment  Effects, Dec. 1979
(percentage)
Effect  Title Il-D'  Title  VI'
Net  job creation  87  84
New programs and services  17  8
Expansion of programs  37  25
Special projects  4  9
Program maintenance  29  42
Job displacement  13  16
1.  The PSE Program in the United States was divided into two separate budget lines, Title Il-D
and Title VI. which had different target groups and regulations goveming program work
activity.
Source: COOK,  R. et al (1985), Public Service  Employment:  The Experience  of a Decade,  Table
3-4: Percentage  Distribution of Net Employment  Effects by Title, W.E.Upjohn  Institute  for
Employment  Research,  Kalamazoo,  Michigan, p.68
5.5  While  there  is little  hard  evidence  on  the  extent  of  displacement  and  still  less  on  the
effectiveness  of the  various  measures  that  have  been  used  to try  to contain  it, certain  tentative
conclusions  can  be  drawn.  The  need  to  avoid  direct  competition  with  the  private  sector  and
to  avoid  substitution  of  PSE  jobs  for  normal  government  employment  suggests  that  there
may  be a trade-off  between  the usefulness  of PSE  activities  and the number  of jobs,  net of
displacement  effects,  that  can be  created.  One approach  that  has been  used  in Ireland  to help
13monitor and control displacement  has been to involve union representatives  in the review and
approval  of PSE projects  at the  local level.  In the end it must be recognized that  although
one of the goals of PSE programs mentioned previously  is to produce  services valued by the
community this may conflict with the goal of creating jobs and reducing unemployment.
5.6  Training.  Training  is  viewed  as  a  way  to  meet  one  of  the  objectives  of  PSE
programs, namely assisting participants adjust to changes in the lablor market and move from
long-term  unemployment  to gainful employment.  Training  is particularly  appropriate  since,
as  described  previously,  participants  in  PSE  programs  tend  to  be  unskilled,  which  is  an
important  factor  limiting  their  employment  prospects.  However,  most  PSE  participants
receive little or no training.  Local providers are primarily  interested in a source of labor, and
time spend in formal training reduces the time spent working  and  increases the  costs of the
program per participant  (and particularly  the costs to the local provider if, as is typically the
case, national financing cannot be used for training).  Moreover, concerns about displacement
tend to generate PSE jobs that are by their nature marginal and low skilled.  Given these two
factors,  it  is  not  reasonable  to  expect  participants  to  acquire  skills  relevant  to  future
employment.
5.7  The US program addressed this problem by requiring that local providers  spend  15-
20 per cent of PSE funding on training.  This was to some extent successful, as the number of
participants receiving  formal trainina  increased.  However. interviews with local and regional
authorities  during  the  evaluation  revealed  that  providing  appropriate  training  for  the  very
unskilled  was difficult.  This factor, coupled with other restrictions  on the type  of work that
could  be carried  out and  the duration  of the  work activity,  caused  many providers  to  lose
interest in PSE and withdraw from the program."
]4VI.  PROGRAM  EXPENDITURE
6.1  National  governments  in the OECD  countries and transition  economies  selected for
this study spend considerable  resources on PSE programs.  In 1993, over $6 billion was spent
on  programs  in Germany.  In  1994, Spain spent almost  $20 million  pesetas  and  the UK's
program  cost  about $150  million.  In relation to  other  labor market  programs,  more  funds
were  allocated  to  labor  market  training  than  to  PSE  programs,  yet  funding  on  PSE
expenditure  is greater than expenditures on employment  subsidies to the private  sector.  (See
Table 6. 1)
Table 6.1:
Public expenditure  in selected labor market programs, 1994
(per cent of GDP)
Unemployment  Labor market  Subsidies to  Public service
compensation  training  private sector'  employment
Denmark  3.78  0.47  . 0.03  0.30
France'  1.72  0.44  0.10  0.14
Germans'  2.03  0.42  0.06  0.27
Spain  3.11  0.15  0.09  0.05
UK-  1.59  0.16
Hungars  1.08  0.20  0.12  0.14
Poland  1.78  0.03  0.13  0.10
I.  Wage  suoidJ  ic to  the private  sector  for  the recruitment  of unemployed  workers  or.,  in some
cases.  r'or  cortinued  employment  of person  whose  jobs are at risk.
2.  Data  is for 1(;  k
,3. Data  is for I  1994.
Source: (O1  (l)  i I  Q5) Employment  Outlook, Tables  T and U. pp. 222-230.
6.2  PSE  pror.aTi  data  for  Hungary  and  Poland  also  absorbed  considerable  sums  in
1994: $38 million  and over $44 million  respectively.  Expenditure  on employment  policies
and programs in Poland shows that PSE spending has grown considerably since  1992, when
it  accounted  for  16 per  cent  of  funding  for  active  employment  programs'2. In  1994,  it
accounted  for almost 40 per  cent of the funding reserved  for active programs.  Expenditure
on the PSE Program also grew in Hungary from 7 per cent of the Employment  Fund in 1991
to 25  per  cent  in  1994.  In comparison  to other  active employment  programs  (Table  6.1),
15more is spent on training programs in Hungary than  on the PSE program whereas  in Poland
the reverse is true.
6.3  According to the data collected for this study, PSE program costs per participant  are
high  compared  with  most other  active  labor programs  and with  unemployment  insurance
(UI) benefits  that many PSE participants  would have otherwise  received.  Typically,  active
employment  programs  cost  more  than  passive  measures  because  they  are  undertaken  in
addition to  passive measures  and  not instead  of them.  That  is, a  participant  of a training
programs  continues  to  receive  unemployment  benefits  or  a  related  living  stipend.  PSE
programs are also more expensive than other active employment  programs,  such as intensive
job placement services and self-employment  programs.  Generally,  in OECD  countries, cost
per participant  are highest for training programs,  immediately followed by direct job  creation
programs  such as  PSE  programs,  self-employment  programs  and  lowest  for  employment
services  such as assistance  with job  search, one-on-one counseling  and  seminars to improve
one's  interview  skills.  For  example,  the  PSE  program  in  the  United  Kingdom  cost
approximately  $2850 per place compared to $300 for "Job  clubs"  and SI 15 for "Job  Search
Seminars".  However, the  UK program  is cheaper than the  "Training  for Work"  program,
which  costs  $3790 per  place13 In Denmark,  the  cost of the PSE  program  was  $28000 per
place, compared with $12400 and $10200 for the employment  subsidy program and the self-
employment  program  respectively.  In Hungary,  the PSE  program  was only  slightly  more
costly than the employment  subsidy program and the self-employment  program.
Table 6.2:
PSE programs costs, 1994
Wage  Other costs
Denmark  Union wages or market rate
France  Minimum wage
Germany  Union wages  or market rate  Loans and grants for work materials
Spain  Social security  contributions
UK  Unemployment  benefit plus £10 per week
USA  Minimum  wage  or  wages  comparable  to  regular  Formal training
Hungary  Minimum wage  Soc. Ins. contr. work materials,
Poland  Up to 75 % of national average wage  Soc. Ins. contr. work materials.
1.  Data is for 1980.
Source:  Data  provided  by  the  national  authorities.  For more information,  see countrv-specific  annexes.
166.4  Unfortunately,  it was not possible  to obtain very  detailed  expenditure  data broken
down by components,  but other program information can provide  some clues as to why PSE
programs  can  be  more  resource-intensive  than  passive  unemployment  benefits  and  some
active employment  programs.  Table  6.2 describes  the various  program  components  which
contribute  to expenditure.  First, PSE  programs tend to pay the minimum  wage or the wage
rate  stipulated  by  trade  unions  for  the  work  being  done.  rather  than  the  typically  lower
unemployment  benefit paid  to unemployment  beneficiaries  and  participants  of most  active
employment  programs.  For example in  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain and  the  United  States,
participants  receive  either  wages laid down by  collective  agreements  or wages  set by  their
employers which, by  law, cannot be lower than  the minimum  wage.  In Denmark,  the PSE
program finances the entirety of the wage and in Germany, the PSE  program  subsidises  50-
70  per  cent  of  the  wages  but  in  exceptional  circumstances  (e.g.  areas  with  high
unemployment)  the subsidy  can be 90  or even  100 per  cent.  In  Spain,  the  PSE  program
subsidizes  the wage  up  to  an  amount  equal  to  the  unemployment  benefit  with  the  work
provider paying the difference.  In France, participants receive the minimum  wage, of which
65-100  per  cent  is paid  by  the  PSE  program.  Hungarian  participants  also  receive  the
minimum  wage which is entirely funded by the PSE program.  In Poland, the PSE program
will pay their participants up to 75 per cent of the average national wage.  Participants  tend to
be  paid  about  50  per  cent  of  the  national  wage,  which  is  significantly  higher  than  the
unemployment  benefit.
6.5  PSE program expenditures can include significant  non-wage  costs both  in terms  of
administration,  social benefit  entitlements,  and materials  to facilitate  implementation  of the
programs.  In Germany, loans can also be granted to program providers  for work materials.
Grant  funds  are  also  available  to  "match"  funds  provided  by  regional  governments
sponsoring work activities.  Similarly the programs in Hungary and Poland can contribute to
the cost of materials needed to carry out the work activity, in Hungary this can amount  to up
to 30% of program costs.  Other non-wage costs include a range of social benefits  including
social  security  contributions.  In  some  programs,  the  project  provider  must  pay  the
contribution,  which  may  make  them  reconsider  participation  in  the  program.  In  other
17programs, such as Poland and HungarY, they are financed by the program.  These costs can be
very  high,  often  approaching  50  percent.  In  some  programs,  such  as  in  France,  the
requirement  to pay  social security  contributions  is waived.  But  even  if it is waived there
remains  a  significant  hidden  cost  imposed  upon  the  social  security  fund  which  may,
subsequently, have to pay benefits to non-contributors.
6.6  There is another  hidden  cost which is one of fiscal substitution.  In some countries,
means-tested benefits  are the responsibility  of the local authorities.  If participation  qualifies
participants  for  the  national  unemployment  benefits  the  local authorities  may  use the  PSE
program to reduce their costs.  In this way, local authorities are able to "chum"  unemployed
individuals  out  of  the  local  welfare  program  and  into  the  national  employment  benefit
system.  For example,  in Germany,  Denmark, Poland and Hungary, the jobless  re-qualify for
unemployment  insurance benefits  after completing  their full duration  in PSE program.  As a
result, PSE participants who were formerly the responsibility  of the local authorities and who
do  not  become  employed  post-program  become  eligible  for  the  national  unemployment
benefits.  At  first  glance.  the  obvious  solution  to  this  "churning"  problem  would  be  to
disqualify PSE participants from gaining UI eligibility  in the countries where this is currently
possible.  However.  overnments  have  been  reluctant  to  implement  this  option,  perhaps
because  of the  complexities  of  employment  legislation,  trade  union  agreements  and  other
political concerns.
6.7  At  a cost-per-participant  being very  expensive  when  compared  to other programs,
some argue that  PSF  wxould  have  to demonstrate  significantly  better  outcomes  in terms  of
participants post-pr-  ram employment  rates than the other alternatives.  However, it can also
be argued that PSE participants are among the most difficult of the unemployed to move back
into jobs.  As a result. greater funds are required for this group.
VII.  EFFECTIVENESS
7.1  Have the  programs  achieved  their primary  objective  of moving  the jobless  out of
unemployment  and  into  work?  Are  the  goods and  services provided through PSE  in
18addition to what would have been available if the program has not been introduced,  and is the
value of the goods and services provided equal or greater than the investment in the program?
Do the  programs  reduce  social  tension  and  create  a  more  stable  political  environment  in
periods  of  transition  and  high  unemployment?  Unfortunately,  this  information  is  not  as
readily  available  as  administrative  program  data.  When  evaluations  are  available,  they
concentrates  either  on  the  program's  irmpact on  the  on  the  unemployment  rate  or  the
programs'  impact  on  individual  post-program  performance.  No  data  has  been  found  to
evaluate the  benefit-cost  of goods and  services  provided,  nor have  studies been  uncovered
that evaluate the lessening of social tensions through PSE programs.
7.2  Impact  on  the  aggregate  unemployment  rate.  The  reduction  of  aggregate
unemployment  rate is often the ultimate policy objective  of PSE programs.  A recent  OECD
Employment  Outlook  14  surveyed two PSE programs that had been evaluated to measure this
impact.  The German  ABM program  was judged  to  significantly  increase  the  flow out of
short-term  unemployment.  but  had  no  significant  impact  on  long-term  unemployment.  A
municipal  public works  program in Finland seemed  to enhance  flows out of unemployment
but it also led to some flow back into joblessness  after participation.  It should be noted that
these results may reflect the fact that  such programs  mechanically  lower the unemployment
rate because the participants are no longer counted as unemployed  since they are no longer in
the labor force;  after the program ends, most participants  return to the labor force and many
are still unemployed.
7.3  Impact  on  individuals.  Post-program  evaluations  that  measure  the  impact  on  the
individual fall into three  categories:  experimental  evaluations that compare the effect of the
programs  on  participants  with  those  of  a  control  group  chosen  prior  to  the  scheme's
initiation;  quasi-experimental  evaluations that choose the control group after the program  is
completed; and surveys of participants several after they  exit the program, that use no control
group.
197.4  The most common  type of evaluation is the survey without a control group:  five of
the nine  programs  studied  in this  paper were evaluated with  this methodolog,y (two had no
evaluation  at all)  The performance  of these five programs varied widely (Table 7.1).  Judged
in terms of the percentage  of program participants, those finding  non-subsidized employment
ranged from 59 per cent (new Larnder)  to only 6 per cent in Poland and 3 per cent in Hungary.
It is important to point out that comparisons across countries are difficult to make because the
surveys  were  undertaken  in  different  years  and  at  different  periods  of  time  after  the
participants  left the program.
7.5  The major drawback of the survey methodology is that it  provides no information about
whether they would have found a.job  in the absence of the  program.  Experiments or quasi-
experiments use a control group to provide such information: in an experiment, eligible participants
are randomly assigned to the PSE program (treatment group) or to a control group; in a quasi-
experiment  the PSE participants are compared with a group of similar unemployed  chosen  frorm  labor
force data after the participants have left the program. No program in this study was evaluated using
an experiment, but quasi-experiments  were recently conducted in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic".
Table 7.1:
Participants'  post-program experience,  1994
(per cent of program participants)
Year  Methods  of evaluation  Employed  Employed  Participating
in other
program
France'  1991  Participant  survey  3 months  after  exit  28  42  22
Germany'  1989  Survey  immediately  after  exit  22  60
Niew  1994  Survey  59  41
Spain  ..  None
UK'  1995  Survey  3 months  after  exit  14  73  13
Hungary'  1994  Survey  immediately  after  exit  3.4
Hungary2  1997  Quasi-experimental  15 vs 302
Poland&  1993  Survey  6.1
Poland'  1997  Quasi-experimental  30 vs 70
1.  Source:  Data provided by the national authorities.  For more information,  see country-specific  annexes.
2.  15 per cent of the participants  were employed  compared to 30 per cent of the control  group.
3.  Source:  O'LEARY.  C.  (1995)  An  Impact  Analysis  of Employment  Programs  in Hungary,  W.E.  Upjohn
Institute  for Employment  Research:  Staff Working Paper 95-30,  Kalamazoo.  Michigan..
4.  Program  statistics from Poznan  region..
5.  PUHANI.  P and STEINER.  V. (1996)  Public  Works for  Poland?  Active  Labor  M4arket  Policies duiring the
Transition,  ZEW-Discussion  Paper, 96-01.
207.6  Hungary,  Poland,  and  the  Czech  Republic  completed  parallel  quasi-experimental
design  studies in  1998 and compared persons who participated  in the program with a group
of persons who were registered as unemployed  at the same time and who did not participate
in the PSE program  or any other active labor market program (see note  #  15). A  "matched
pair  method"  was used to  create a  control  group which  was  similar to  the  participants  in
characteristics  such as age, gender, education, work experience and length of unemployment.
The impact  of  PSE programs  on employment,  earnings,  and use of  unemployment  benefits
is  presented  in Table  7.22. The  results  indicate  mostly  negative  impacts  on  eamings  and
employment.  In  two  countries  there  were  significant  positive  impacts  on  the  amount  of
unemployment  compensation  paid (more compensation paid). These results  are partially  the
result  of program  design  where  participants  may  requalify  for  benefits  by  participating  in
PSE.  The results  for Poland  indicate  a significant positive  impact  (+0.10)  for transition  to
regular  non-subsidized  employment  when  private  contractors  were  used.  Use  of  public
contractors had  a significant negative impact (-0.05).  (Table 7.2  shows the  combined impact
public and private PSE contractors).
Table 7.2:
Overall Impact of Public Service Employment Programs
Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland
Any Employment  -0.05  -0.07**  -0.05**
Current  Employment  -0.10***  -0.06**  0.02
Initial  Earnings  na  +$4.13**  Na
Current  Earnings  -$35  -$9**  -56
Unemployment  Compensation  -St 14 *  9**  +$103 *
na -Not available
Impact statistically  significant  at the 99 percent level of confidence
**  Impact statistically  significant  at the 95 percent level of confidence
*  Impact Statistically  significant  at the 90% level of confidence
7.7  The employment  impact, following  completion  of  PSE  programs,  on  subgroups  of
participants  is  presented  in  Table  7.3.  The  employment  impact  by  gender  tends  to  be
negative,  or  insignificant.  with  a  positive  indication  for  females  in  Hungary.  In  Poland,
21where  there  is  a  large  number  of young  people  involved  in public  works  projects,  youth
reemployment  is negatively impacted by participation  in PSE.  Participation in PSE does not
help  the  long-term  unemployed  re-enter  normal jobs,  and  only  has  a  positive  impact  for
short-term unemployed  in Hungary.
Table 7.3:
Employment Impact of Public Service Employment  Programs by Subgroup /1
Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland
Any/current  any/current  any/current
Gender
Male  0.02/-0.12**  0.01/0.01  -0.07**!0.00
Female  0.08!-0.07  0.12**/0.10**  0.02i0.04
Age
Youth  0.01!-0.09  0.00/-0.01  -0.07**/0.01
Middle age  0.05!-0.08  0.06/0.04 0.14/0.14  -0.04/0.01
Older worker  0.06/-0.13**  -0.05/0.04
Education
Primary  0.05/-0.1 *  0.02/0.01  -0.01/-0.00
Secondary  0.00/-0.09  0.03/0.03 /2  -0.08**!0.02 /2
Post Secondary  -0.35/-0.29  0.13/0.15  -0.12/-0.22
Unemployment
Short <12 mos  0.07/-0.12  0.08**/0.05**  0.02/0.02
Long >12 mos  0.04/-0,10**  -0.02/0.03  -0.  13**/-0.01
Impact statistically significant  at the 99 percent  level of confidence
Impact statistically  significant  at the 95 percent level of confidence
*  Impact  statistically  significant  at the 90 percent level of confidence
/1 Any employment and current employment  at time of survey
/2  Secondary  vocational school
VIII.  Conclusions
8.1  Experience  with  PSE  programs  in  OECD  countries  date  to  the  1  930s  when
governments  introduced  such programs  for temporary  poverty  alleviation and to employ the
millions of jobless  created by the depression.  Today,  unemployment  insurance largely fulfils
the poverty alleviation role. However, PSE programs continued to be used for job creation as
one option  among  many  active employment  programs,  including  training  and  employment
subsidies  to private  firms.  In OECD  countries,  PSE  programs  remain  smaller  than  many
22other active employment  programs.  In contrast,  in the transition economies  of  Hungary and
Poland they are relatively  large and growing,  largely in response to the spread of long-terrn
unemployment,  and  therefore  do  meet  the  objective  of  absorbing  large  numbers  of
unemployed in the short-term.
8.2  Work-test.  An emerging objective of PSE programs, besides putting people back to
work, is to test the willingness to work of those  in receipt of benefits.  This is particularly  a
concern  in  countries  which  have  relatively  generous  social  benefits  or  large  informal
economies.  Requiring  participation in PSE programs may help to eliminate  individuals  who
are unwilling to work or who are employed in the informal  economy from receiving  income
support.  This issue has not been evaluated in the PSE programs  surveyed in this  study, but
the  effectiveness  of  this  method  --  compared  with  other  possibilities,  such as  mandatory
counseling or screening through interviews  -- is worth further investigation.
8.3  Short-term job  creation and displacement.  PSE programs do contribute to short-term
job creation, but their impact may be considerably muted by displacement  if the programs are
not regulated  appropriately.  That is, PSE jobs  that do  truly  useful  work  may  lead to  the
displacement  of other  workers doing the  same jobs.  This may  be  because  the  subsidized
work-force can operate with lower costs than private  sector alternatives  or, more frequently,
because the local govermments and organizations who are charged with the implementation  of
PSE programs may simply replace other workers with those paid by the national government
through the program.  To reduce displacement  and increase net job  creation, many programs
are  designed  to  carry  out  marginal  tasks  or  set  limits  on  the  duration  of  a  post.  Such
measures  tend  to reduce  the social value  of the jobs  being done  in the  PSE  context.  The
paucity of data on job displacement  effects does not allow us to draw robust conclusions  on
net  job  creation,  but  the  data  which  are  available  suggest  that  there  are  significant  job
displacement  and, therefore, that net job creation is lower than the gross numbers involved  in
the program.
238.4  Targeting.  Governnent  Ministries target  PSE programs to those judged  to have the
most  difficulty  finding  a job  by  issuing  directives  to  labor  offices  which  administer  the
programs, on which groups  are eligible.  In practice, most PSE programs succeed in targeting
long-term  unemployed  older  workers, or else young  inexperienced  workers.  The evidence
available for Poland and Hungary suggests that targeting  efficiency  could be improved.  For
example, certain groups, such as former public administration  officials and those with higher-
education, tend to be over-represented.  In all the programs  surveyed, most participants  were
unskilled.
8.5  Gender.  Programs  focusing  on  manual  work  have  a  high  majority  of  male
participants,  but if work  activity  is in the  area of social care, female  participation  rates  are
increased.  Thus, if gender  issues are of concern to  Governments,  the type  of work activity
that is financed through PSE programs must be carefully considered and broadened.
8.6.  Improving  employability  and  training.  One  objective  of  PSE  programs  is  to
promote long-term participation  in the labor market by providing  training for the unskilled to
improve their employability.  Although  only one of the programs  studied offered any formal
training, the others were designed to provide on-the-job  training.  However, the work activity
undertaken  in  PSE  programs  is,  most  often, unskilled,  in  part  to  enable  programs  to  be
extended quickly to a large number of participants who themselves  tend to be unskilled,  and
in  part  to  contain  training  and  supervision  costs.  In  addition,  as  mentioned  previously,
program  providers  are  often  restricted  in the  type  of  work  they  offer  in  order  to  reduce
displacement.  As a result, it is not clear that this  objective  is being met by the program or
that  the type  of on-job  training  that  is being provided  is of value  in leading to  permanent
employment.
8.7  Program  costs.  PSE  program  costs  per  participant  are  high  compared  with  the
unemployment  insurance  (UI)  benefits  that  many  PSE  participants  would  have  otherwise
received.  PSE programs  are also more  expensive  than  other  active employment  programs,
except perhaps for training and self-employment  programs  in some countries.  This high cost
stems  from  several  factors,  including  wage  rates  that exceed UI benefits, non-wage  costs
24(social  benefit  contributions  and  material  and  supervisory  costs).  In  addition,  local
authorities  may attempt to reduce their welfare program  burden by  churning people through
nationally  funded  PSE  programs.  Because  of  these  extra  costs,  some  argue  that  PSE
programs need to provide greater benefits  (i.e. lead to long-term employment.  provide added
value  goods  and  services)  than  alternative  programs  to  be  justified  and  there  is  limited
evidence that this can be achieved (see following paragraph).
8.8  Effectiveness.  There  is  evidence that  PSE  programs  can reduce  the aggregate
unemployment  rate, but that the effect  is temporary.  The impact  on individuals  is, on the
whole,  uncertain.  In  many,  though  not  all,  programs,  a  substantial  number  of  former
participants are able to find non-subsidized  employment.  However, this criterion overstates
program effectiveness  because  it does not account for the possibility  that they  would have
found  employment  even  without  having  participated.  One way  to  account  for  this  is to
compare  the  employment  history  of  program  participants  with  that  of  demographically
similar non-participants.  Somewhat  surprisingly, this  evidence suggested  that participation
in  PSE  programs  might  significantly  lower  the  chances  of  finding  non-subsidized
employment.  This  probably  underestimates  program  effectiveness,  iri that  it mav reflect
selection  bias  that  is  not  fully  controlled  by  demographic  variables  --  certainly,  such
programs are meant to aid those least likely to be employable.  No conclusions  were reached
concerning the benefit-cost  impact of goods and services delivered  through PSE programs,
or the contribution  of PSE  programs  to  a reduction  of  social  tensions  in  periods of high
unemployment.
8.9  Implementation.  If  PSE  programs  are  going  to  be  implemented,  consideration
should be given to having them  operated  bv private  sector employers  as opposed to public
agencies.  Private  sector  deliver;  has,  in  some  countries  (e.g.  Poland),  resulted  in more
positive  impact  on post-program  employment.  However.  the  displacement  effect remains
significant.
8.10  Lessons.  Evidence  from  the  programs  studies  in  this  paper  suggests  that  PSE
program  are  expensive  and  relatively  ineffective.  PSE  programs  are  also
25problematic  because  the  government,  in  effect,  becomes  an  "employer  of  last resort",  a
dangerous  message to send in all countries but especially  in transition  economies  were the
government has been the employer.  If governments  insist on creating a PSE program, there
are  some  guidelines  which  can  contain  costs  and  minimize  interference  with the  private
sector job market.  First, wages can be set low in order to minimize the attractiveness of the
program  and  foster  self-targeting.  Second,  in order to  minimize  displacement,  the work
undertaken  must  extend  (not  supplant)  existing  services.  Thlird, programs  should  not
attempt  to  pursue  training  objectives  (training  objectives  are  better  pursued  in  training
programs).  Finally, it must be recognized that these programs are temporary, income support
measures and should not be construed as active labor redeployment  programs.
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27ANNEX 1: DENMARK
The Arbejdstilbudsordningen  -- an active labor market program -- was introduced  in  1978 in
order to assist recipients of unemployment  benefits to move out of long-term  unemployment.
The program introduced three instruments in an active labor  'market  policy:
*  Uddannelsesydelse  (Education Allowance);
*  Ivaerksaetterydelse  (Support for Enterprise Start-up)
*  Offentlig og Privat Arbejdstilbud (Job Offer in the Public and Private Sector).
Job Offer  in the Public  and Private Sector.  In 1978 only those who  had  been unemployed
for  30  months  were  eligible  for  a  Job  Offer  in  the  Public and  Private  Sector.  In  1981,
eligibility  rules were changed so that those younger  than 25 must have been  unemployed for
12 months in the last  15 months, and those over 25 they must have been unemployed  for 21
months in the last 27.  Participants  in a Public Sector Job Offer received a wage laid down by
collective  agreement  (maximum  81 kroner  per  hour)  Those  in  Private  Sector  Job Offers
received wages set by their employers (typically the market wage).
The maximum  allowable  time  that a participant  could  be in a Job  Offer  was 37 hours per
week for up to 3 years.  Job Offer placements lasted from 6 months  to 3 years.  Participants
could undertake more than one placement due to the cyclical nature of the benefits and active
program  system.  During  the  period  1984-1988,  25  per  cent  of  JOS  participants  were
undertaking a 2nd job offer.
Recent reforms.  The Arbejdstilbudsordninge  has been revised on a number of occasions,  in
particular.  1981 and  1986, but most extensively in 1994.  Under 1994 revisions,  the program
has been replaced by the Activ Arbejdsmarkedspolitik  or Act on Active Labor  Market Policy
which  includes  a Pool  Job  option.  The new  option replaces  the  Job  Offer Scheme.  Five
years was  made the  maximum  amount  of time that  a  person  could  spend  either  receiving
benefit or participating in active emplovment  scheme, of which the last 3 years has to be as a
participant  of an active labor market program.
28Program data from the Ministry  of Labor  show that 45 per  cent of participants  were  male.
Also, 55 per cent were unemployed for at least 6 months prior to participating in the program.
The other 45 per  cent were unemployed  for over 6 months.  Table  1 shows the numbers  of




Job Offer in Public/Private  Sector
Education  Support for  Public sector  Private sector  Total
Allowance  enterprise start-up
1985  1 149  400  38400  12 100  52 049
1986  4 315  1 400  30 100  7 600  43 415
1997  4397  1 000  28 800  5400  39597
1988  4 366  800  29 500  4 900  39 566
1989  15 517  5 300  37 700  6 100  64 617
1990  15 219  5 641  40 123  7 197  68 180
1991  21 819  6392  50825  9214  88250
1992  25 867  6 743  52 071  12 553  97 234
1993  30 074  6 949  74 988  15 580  127 591
1994  27 296  3 433  27 869  9 749  68 347
Source:  ARBEJDSN1  I\ISI-ERIET(1994,1995)Arbejdsmarkedspolitiskarbog,Table2-15.
Table  2:
Program Expenditure per Program Participant 1994
Educ,iliOL Allo\wance  $ 21000
Suppr  :e- Enterprise Start-up  11000
Nlamnn:.li 1 I Payment  21000
Job  ()tic.  n  Public  Sector  29000
Job  )tltc-  inr  Private  Sector  14000
'ImUrce: ARBEJDSMINISTERIET.  unpublished  data.
29ANNEX2:  FRANCE
Contrat emploi solidarite  (Employment Solidarity  Contracts)
Introduced in 1990, the Contrat emploi solidarite  (CES) or Employment  Solidarity Contracts
replaced the Travaux d'utilite public  program.  The Contracts create jobs  for the unemployed
in  public  bodies  or  private  non-profit  enterprises  and  the  objective  is  to  reintegrate  the
unemployed into active life and to provide training  to the long-tern  unemployed and  young
job-seekers.  The  Contracts  are  also  meant  to  provide  goods  and  ser-vices useful  to  the
community.  Initially, they  were targeted at young job-seekers  with a low educational  levels
or long-term unemployed.  However,  in 1992, the  contracts  were targeted at  the following
groups:
*  long-term unemployed registered for at  least 12 months in the 18 months preceding
their recruitment;
*  job-seekers aged over 50;
*  recipients of the RiMI;
*  handicapped workers;
*  young people from 16 to 25.  who hold at least a level V diploma;
3  recipients of the Specific Solidarity Allowance.
In  1993, the  priority  target  groups  were  redefined  again  in  accordance  with  the  so  called
"Mesure d'urgence pour 1'emploi".  The groups now targeted were:  job-seekers  registered for
more than three years;  job-seekers  aged more than 50 and registered for at least 12 months in
the  preceding  18  months;  and  recipients  of  the  Revenu  minimum  d 'insertion  (RMJl)
unemployed for one year.  In 1994, 72 per cent of the participants were characterized  as long-
term  unemployed,  as compared  to  34 per  cent  in  1990.  Furthermnore. 25  per  cent  of the
participants were receiving  RMI in 1994 as compared  to 16 per  cent in 1990.  Of these, two
thirds were characterized  as long-term unemployed.  In 1994, targeting the program towards
the young unemployed  aged from 18 to 25 was strengthened.  Program participants  can only
be hired byv  local and regional  government bodies,  public establishments  (i.e. social security
institutions)  and  non-profits  associations.  The  employer  or  sponsor  must  submit  a  job
30vacancy  to  the  National  Employment  Agency  (ANPE),  enter  into  a  contract  with  an
unemployed  person  meeting  the  contract  requirements  and  sign  an  agreement  with  the
regional office of the Ministry  of Labor (Direction Departementale  du Travail, d'Emploi  et de
la Formation Professionnelle).
The participant  signs a part-time contract (20 hours a week)  for a minimum  of three  months
and a maximum of 12 months.  The Contract can be extended for 36 months if the participant
is:  long-term unemployed for three years; long-term unemployed  aged 50 or over;  registered
for more than one  year;  RMI recipients  without  employment  for more than  one year.  The
average duration amounted to 8.4 months in 1994.
The Contracts fund 65 per cent of the participant's minimum  wage, and up to  1  00 per cent in
case of participants who belong to one of the following target  groups:  long-term unemployed
for more than three years, the RMI recipients  unemployed  for more than one year; and those
aged 50 and over having been registered as unemployed  for more than one year.  The sponsor
is granted 100 per cent exemption from employers' social security contributions.
Several  tables  are  presented  below.  Tables  1 through  5  describe  the  participants  of  the
program.  The data show that significant numbers  are among  the long-term  unemployed, are
more likely to be women and tend to be young (less than 26 yrs).  The tables also show that a
third of participants  stay in the program for the maximum  amount  of time and  that at  least
one quarter are without  work  experience.  Tables  6 through  8 describe  program  providers,




1992  1993  1994
Total  598  893  659 381  714 856
New contracts  449 767  438 893  488 739
Extended  Contracts  149 126  220 488  226 117
Source: MINISTERE  DU TRAVAIL  DU DIALOGUE  SOCIAL  ET DE LA PARTICIPATION
(July 1995) "Contrats  emplois  solidarite et contrat emplois consolides  en 1994",  Premieres  Svntheses.
Tableau 1.
31Table 2:
Previous unemployment  duration, July 1993
(per cent)
Target  Group  1994  1993
Long-term  unemployed  for  more than I year, aged over 50  6.0  5.7
Long-term  unemployed  for more  than I year,  aged < 26  18.9  16.3
Long-term  unemployed  for more  than three  years  13,1  12.7
Source:  MINISTERE  DU TRAVAIL DU DIALOGUE  SOCIAL  ET DE LA PARTICIPATION





1992  1993  1994
Females  65.3  63.2  62.9
Age
< 26  46.3  34.7  33.1
Between  26 and 34  24.9  29.7  30.6
Between  35 and 49  22.7  28.3  28.8
> 50  6.1  7.3  7.5
Source: MINISTERE  DU TRAVAIL  DU DIALOGUE  SOCIAL  ET DE
LA PARTICIPATION  (July 1995),  "Contrats emplois  solidarite  et contract
emplois consolides  en 1994".  Premieres  Syntheses,  Tableau 4.
Table 4:
Participant duration in program
(per cent)
1992  1993  1994
3 months  22.7  21.5  16.7
4 and 5 months  6.6  5.6  4.3
6 months  21.8  22.8  22.3
7to I Imonths  11.9  12.5  10.2
12 months  36.0  36.6  45.7
More  than 12  months  1.1  1.0  0.8
Source: MINISTERE  DU TRAVAIL DU DIALOGUE  SOCIAL ET DE LA PARTICIPATION
(July  1995) "Contrats emplois solidarite et  contrat emplois conso]ides en  1994". Premieres




1992  1993  1994
Non qualified Workman  24.1  24.4  25.0
Qualified Workman  8.3  10.4  10.6
Contremaitre, agent de maitrise  0.5  0.6  0.6
Clerical employment  15.2  16.9  16.9
Commerce employment  8.9  8.8  8.6
Service employment  12.2  12.3  12.8
Engineer, Manager  0.9  1.3  1.5
Others or without experience  29.9  25.3  23.9
Source: MINISTERE  DU TRAVAIL  DU DIALOGUE  SOCIAL ET DE LA PARTICIPATION
(July  1995)  "Contrats  emplois  solidarite  et  contrat  emplois  consolides  en  1994",  Premieres
Syntheses,  Tableau 3.
Table 6:  Providers
(per cent)
1992  1993  1994
Regional Authorities  31.1  26.9  26.9
Public establishmnents  29.7  35.0  34.4
Associations  36.2  35.1  36.0
Others  3.0  3.0  2.7
Source:  MINISTERE  DU TRAVAIL  DU DIALOGUE SOCIAL  ET DE LA PARTICIPATION,
(July  1995)  "Contrats  emplois  solidarite  et  contrat  emplois  consolides  en  1994".  Premieres
Syntheses,  Tableau 2.
Table 7:
Program expenditure'
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
CES  Expenditures (S millions)  500  1287  1785  2608  2561
CEC Expenditure ($ millions)  ..  ..  ..  12  89
Annual average stock of CES participants  24 198  84 874  275 854  370 090  387 119
Annual average stock of CEC participants  ..  ..  ..  2 000  15 044
Average cost per CES participants ($)  15165  6092  7048  6614
Average cost per CEC participants (FF)  ..  ..  ..  ..  5895
1.  Does not include the cost of the social security exemptions.
Source:  Comptabilite  publique  .Table 8:
Post-program  experience (1991)1
Employed  50.0
of which participating in CES  22.0
Unemployed  41.5
Inactive  8.5
of which training (stage)  2.0
1.  Survey of participants 3 months  after leaving the program.
Source:  AUCOUTURIER,  A. (1994)  Panels et Evaluation  des Politiques
de L'Emploi, Ministere  du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Formation,
La Documentation  Fran,aise,  Paris, p.3 5.
34ANNEX 3: GERMANY
Foerderung  von Allgemeinen  Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung  (Promoting  General
Job Creation Measures).
Foerderung  von  Allgemeinen  Mlassnahmen zur  Arbeitsbeschaffung  (I4BM) or  Measure  to
Promote  General Job  Creation was introduced  in  1969 and  revised  in  1990  to include  the
New  Lander.  The ABM  is  a  direct  job-creation  program  with  three  objectives:  reduce
unemployment  by  providing  temporary  employment;  create  the  necessary  conditions  for
providing  the  unemployed  with  a  permanent  job;  and  improve  social  and  other
infrastructures.  Initially, the ABM program was designed for counter-cyclical  purposes,  but
with continuing,  high levels of unemployment,  the ABM program  has become  a  structural
employment measure targeted at the long-term unemployed.
The Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Federal Employment  Service) is responsible for implementing
the ABM program  through  its  11 regional  employment  offices  and  184 local employment
offices.  The  Federal  Employment  Service  has  the  overall  responsibility  for  setting  the
program's  budget  ceiling.  the  duration  of  the  program  and  other  program  criteria.  The
regional  employment  offices  co-ordinate and  supervise the  different  ABM projects  in their
regions.  The local employment  offices  prepare aiid implement the  ABM projects  with  the
local  providers  who  apply for  ABM funding  for their  projects.  The local  offices  identify
projects  for  ABM  funding,  select  the  participants  and  monitoring  the  project.  Eligible
providers  are  regional  and  local  governments,  non-profit  groups  such  as  charitable
organizations,  church,  Treuhands and co-operatives.  Private enterprises  contracted  to carry
out public works and services are also eligible for ABM funding.
Not all of the registered unemployed are eligible for the ABM program.  Participants  must be
unemployed  for  6  months  within  the  last  12  month  period  and  must  have  received
unemployment  benefits or assistance.  These restrictions  do not apply if the participants  are
among  the difficult-to-place  unemployed,  such as:  the long-term  unemployed  (one year  or
more);  workers  over the age of 50;  persons under the age of 25, who  have not completed
vocational  training  and have been registered  as unemployed  for at  least 3  months;  and  the
severely disabled.  Initially, in the New Lander the ABM program did not target any particular
35group and was open to all registered unemployed.  However, since 1994. the program has been
modified to resemble the Old Lander program.
An  ABM  project's  duration  is  typically  1  year  but  it  can be  extended  to  two  years  if
permanent  non-funded jobs  are to be created.  The duration  can be extended  to three  years
upon which the sponsor must fulfil the obligation to create permanent jobs.
The ABM projects are financed by subsidies to the public or private non-profit  sponsors.  As
a rule, the subsidy corresponds to 50-75 per  cent of wages but in exceptional  circumstances
the subsidy could be 90 or even  100 per cent.  In addition, loans can be granted for measures
which  are of particular  importance  to  the labor  market.  The BA can  also  make  available
additional funds for loans and subsidies provided these are matched by contributions from the
lander.  From the beginning of 1991 to the end of 1992 more liberal conditions for grants were
applied in the New Lander.  In addition to the wage subsidy of 90 or 100 percent, the cost of
material were financed from a special budget line: Upswing East Project.  The "Upswing East
Project" (Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung Ost), introduced in March  1991, aimed to provide
stimulus for investment and jobs in the New Lander.
Several tables are presented below.  Tables I through 5 describe the participants, the types of
jobs which were created and the various organizations which delivered the program.  Tables 6-9




Year  Old Lander  New Lander
1990  83 350  12 198
1991  82 960  422 349
1992  78 179  296000
1993  50 518  243 094
1994  57 443  194 176
Source:  BUNDESANSTALT  FUR ARBEIT  (1994) "Forderung  von Allgemeinen
Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung  (ABM)  im Jahre  1994 - Bisheriges  Bundesgebiet-"
ABMInformationen,  Referat  Ib3, Ubersicht  1.
VOLKEL,  BRIGITTE,  "Implementation  von Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen  (ABM) in den
neuen Bundeslandem-  Erfahrungen,  Probleme,  Forschungsbedarf."  Mitt.4B 4/94; p.3 61.
Table 2:
Participant Characteristics  in the Old Lander
(per cent)
Participants  1992  1993  1994
Long term unemployed  56.8  58.2  62.4
Under 25 years w/o vocational training  17.3  20.3  18.7
Women  39.6  39.9  35.5
Over 50 years old  16.5  18.5  19.0
With health limitations  8.4  7.4  8.4
Severely disabled  7.5  7.6  7.4
Source: BA (1994) "Forderung  von Allgemeinen  Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung  (ABM)  im Jahre 1994-
Bisheriges Bundesgebiet-"  ABM  Informationen.  Referat Ib3, lUbersicht 5.
Table 3:
Occupational  Skills. 1991
(per cent)
New Lander  Old Lander
No vocational  training  5.8  55.1
Craftsmen  52.9  27.8
Technician  6.3  1.4
Technical College  22.3  2.1
Higher Education  8.9  9.7
Source: SPITZNAGEL.E.  (1993) "Zur Bruickenfunktion  der Allgemeinen Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung
(ABM).  IAB iVerkstattbericht  Ubersicht 5.
BA (1994). "FOrderung von Allgemeinen  Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung  (ABM)  im Jahre
1994 - Bisheriges Bundesgebiet"  ABMInformationen.  Referat  Ib3, Obersicht 6.
37Table 4:
Types of Jobs Created
(per cent)
Economic Infrastructure  21.5
Social Infrastructure  20.2
Administration/Education/Research  1027
Restoration and Planification  25.0
Environmental  5.9
Tourist and Sport Infrastructure  5.4
Total  100.0
Source:  IAB study results as quoted  in SPITZNAGEL,  E. (1992) "Allgemeine
Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung  (ABM) in den neuen Bundeslandem",
MittAB 3, Ubersicht 5.
Table 5:  Providers
Community  37.3
Lander  1.8
Other Public Authorities  5.5
Church organizations  5.8
Non-Profit organizations  12.7
Private Enterprises  13.2
Treuhand  12.8
ABS  10.5
1.  ABS are companies for work occupation  and structural promotion
"Gesellschaften  zur Arbeits-Beschaftigungs-und  Strukturf6rderung".
Source:  SPITZNAGEL,  E. (1989) "Zielgruppenorientierung  und
Eingliederungserfolg  bei Allgemeinen  Massnahmen  zur Arbeitsbeschaffung(  ABM)
".MittAB  4; p.537.
Table 6:
Expenditures  for ABM
(millions S)
Year  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
New Federal Lander'  34.7  3322  6656  5653  12244
Old Federal Lander  1500  1529  1607  1265  1334
Source:  SPITZNAGEL,  E.  (1992)  "Allgemeine  Massnahmen  zur  Arbeitsbeschaffung  (ABM)  in  den  neuen
Bundeslandern",  Mift  AB,  1992,  p.  279;  and,  BA  (1994)  "Forderung  von  Allgemeinen  Massnahmen  zur
Arbeitsbeschaffung  (  ABM)  im  Jahre  1994-  Bisheriges  Bundesgebiet-"  ABM  Informationen,  Referat  Ib3,
Ubersicht
1.  Sum of FES and Federal Government  Expenditure.
Source:
38Table 7:
Expenditure  per Participant
($)
Year  Old Lander  New Lander
1991  27 289  19 386
1994  29 373  30 678
Source:  Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt-und  Berufsforschung  der Bundesanstalt
fur Arbeit (IAB), 24.08.1995.
Table 8:
Post-program  Experience in the Old Lander,  1989
Immediately Post-  32 Months Post-
program  program
Employed  22  41
of which employed by ABM sponsor  9
employed by other  7
self-employed  7
Unemployed  60  41
Source:  SPITZNAGEL.  E.  (1989)  ,"Zielgruppenorientierung  und  Eingliederungserfolg  bei
allgemeinen  Massnahmen  zur  Arbeitsbeschaffung  (ABM)".  Mitteilung  aus  der  Arbeitsmarkt-  und
Berufsforschung,  p.525 and Abbildung  4.
Table 9:
Post-Program  Experience in the New Lander, 1994
Employed  59
employed by the ABM sponsor  17
employed by other  40
self-employed  2
Unemploved  41
1.  The Arbeitsmarkt-Monitor  is a statistical instrument  created to observe the
labour market in the New Federal Lander during the economic change.
Source:  IAB (May 1995). Arbeitsmarkt-Monitor  fur die neuen
BundesIandern.Umfrage  11/1994, Ubersicht  11, p.8.
39ANNEX 4:  HUNGARY
Prior  to  1991 all labor  market  programs,  both active  and passive,  were paid  for  out of the
Employment  Fund.  The  introduction  of  the  1991 Employment  Act  created  two  separate
groups  of programs.  Under this  Act the programs  being paid  out of the Employment  Fund,
funded by the State  Budget, were strictly active and largely discretionary.  Other  programs,
which  may be termed  entitlements,  including  unemployment  compensation  and  costs of the
employment labor offices, were be paid for out of a new fund called the Solidarity Fund.  The
Solidarity  Fund is financed  by  taxes  on the  total wages paid  by enterprises  and  earned by
workers.  The original tax rates were 5 percent for employers  and 1 percent for workers, these
rates have since been raised to 7 percent and 2 percent.  As of January.  1995, the Employment
Act  was  again  modified  and  financing  for  all  active  and  passive  programs  are  now  the
responsibility  of the Solidarity Fund.
Koasnii Munkavigzis  (Public Employment Program).
One  of  the  activity  employment  programs  is  the  K&zhasnz7 Munkavigzis  or  Public
Employment  Program.  The Public Employment Program has several purposes.  The primary
and initial aim of the program is mainly one of income transfer to the long term unemployed
while at the same time giving people regular work activity to maintain their basic work skills.
Secondary, and emerging aims, include using the program to contribute to provision  of public
services and development  of public  infrastructure  which may  not otherwise be provided and
enhancing the re-employment possibilities  of participants.
Finally,  Hungary is experimenting  with the use of public employment  as an informal  "work
test"  for recipients  of social  assistance.  After the  entitlement  to  unemployment  benefits,
which  run  for  12  months,  is  exhausted,  the  unemployed  may  be  eligible  for  a  social
assistance  benefit.  These recipients  may be requested to participate in a public works project
for up  to 3 months.  The specific  regulations  defining the operation  of the  "work  test"  are
defined  in Section  16 (a) of the January  1996 revision of the Employment  Act.  This project
is separate from the Public Employment Program although it is very similar.
40Article 16 of the 1991 Act provides that the subsidy for the Public Employment  Program may
be up  to 70 percent of direct  costs provided that no payment  from another agency  or under
other provisions  is available.  The 1995 reforms allow payment of up to 90 percent in special
cases (e.g. where  local governments  are in difficult financial conditions  and  cannot provide
the 30 percent  matching  funds/resources).  These costs  can include  salary, social  insurance
contributions,  work clothing, tools, and expenditures incurred by the extra management tasks
of employers.  In practice, most of the subsidy is for wages.  The subsidy may be provided to
a  private  sector company  if workers  are assigned  by the  unemployment  office  and  are not
employed for a "businesslike economic activity".
The Employment  Act  specifies the  duration  an unemployed  person  may  participate  in  the
Public Employment  Program as 12 months.  The program is meant to absorb the unemployed
in receipt  of benefits.  Those  who  have  exhausted  their benefits  are  not eligible  for  this
program.
Program data from the Ministry of Labor has showin  -that the average duration in the program
is 6 months.  Other data show that 3.4 per cent of participants were employed in unsubsidized
jobs  at  the  pro-ranm exit  (Sziklai,  E.  and  Varga,  I.  (1995)  Az  1994-ben  befeje_ett  aktiv
munkaeropiaci  17r(),<g11Wn7ok  hatekonysaganak  vizsgalata  a  monitoring  alkalmazasaval
(Evaluation  ol  ..  completed  in  1994  using  the  monitoring  information  system),
Orszagos Munklaug1  Kozpont, Budapest).
Several tables are >hoMwn  below.  Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide data on participant  characteristics




1992  1993  1994  1995
Total  13 880  50 875  69 674  86 496
Source:  Ministry of Labor.
41Table 2:
Participant  Characteristics, 1991'
Age  31.2 years
Education  8.7 years
Male  67.4%
Specialization  (manual)  17.0%
Specialization  (technical)  6.6%
White collar worker  8.1%
Unskilled  67.1%
1.  Based on a 1993 survey of 429 PSE participants  who had been in the
program  in 1991.
Source:  O'LEARY.  C. (1995)An  Impact Analysis  of Empioyment  Programs  in Hungary,
Staff Working Paper 95-30,  W.E. Upjohn  Institute,  Kalamazoo,  Michigan,  Table 9.
Table 3:
Type  of Work Activity
(percent)
1992  1993  1994  1995
Municipal public works  81.5  71.8  68.5  74.7
Health and social  7.0  8.2  9.3  8.8
Culture and education  7.7  8.1  8.1  5.9
Other  3.8  12.0  14.1  10.7
Source:  Ministrv of Labor.
Table 4:
Employment Fund Expenditure  on Active Labor Market Programs
(per cent)
1991  1992  1993  1994
Training. Retraining  17.2  20.9  22.7  22.9
Public Works  7.2  12.1  18.9  25.0
Employment Subsidy  02  2.3  9.2  13.2
Self-Employment Program  0.3  1.8  3.1  3.1
Source: Ministry of Labor and National  Labor Center.
Table 5:
Program expenditure per participant per month, 1995
(S)
Public Employment  Program  103
Wage Subsidy Program  102
Entrepreneur  Assistance  Program  95
Maximum  UI Payment  143
Source:  Ministry of Labor
42ANNEX 5:  POLAND
The  1991  Employment  Act  introduced  Udzial  bezrobotnych  zatrudnionych  po  robotach
publicznych  (Employment Measure for the Unemployed  through Public Works) and referred
to  them  as  "work  performed  by  the  unemployed  which  has  been  organized  by  local
administrations  or other agencies of the national administration,  aimed in particular at socio-
economic  development".  Directors  of local  labor offices  are responsible  for  initiating  and
financing public works projects  if there  are no possibilities  of ensuring  suitable employment
to the unemployed.  The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for the rules and
regulations  governing public works projects.  The 1994 Employment  Act continued to allow
for the  creation  of public  works  and  specified  their  duration.  The broad  criteria  is listed
below.
Udzial bezrobotnych zatrudnionych  po  robotach publicznych  (Employment Measure for  the
UJnemployed  through Public Works)
The Labor Fund finances the wages of the participants  of Public Work  up to 75 per  cent of
the national average wage.  The Labor Fund also covers the social insurance contributions of
the  participant  (45  percent  of  wage)  which  allows  the  participant  to  be  eligible  for
unemployment  insurance  after  6  months.  In areas  of high,  long-term  unemployment  the
regional labor office, in consultation with the local labor office, may finance up to 50 per cent
of the material costs connected to the public works project.  However, the material  costs may
not exceed 25 per cent of the wage and social insurance costs financed from the Labor Fund.
The 1994 Employment  Act  specified the  duration  an unemployed  may  participate  in public
works as 6 months.  In addition, the public works project may not run longer than  12 months.
Public works projects are meant tt  absorb the long-term  unemploved, particularly  those who
are unskilled.  In practice, there is evidence that it is increasingly  being targeted at those who
have  exhausted  their  unemplovment  insurance  (UI)  benefits,  at  single  parents  or  at  low-
income families.
43The Ministry  introduced  guidelines  for public  works  projects  in  March  1995.  Local  labor
offices are permitted to finance public works projects if the output of the project is socially or
economically  useful.  The project  must  not compete  with  the private  sector.  Most  of the
projects  are  for  road  works,  forestry  projects,  environment  protection,  maintenance  of
recreational  facilities  and  sewage  improvements.  The  guidelines  introduced  in  March
propose  that projects  mav  also be created in the  social welfare  sector (e.g. care of the aged,
childcare).  The new regulations  also disallow the creating of projects  (e.g. clerical work) in
Mayor's  Offices.  Different  levels  of government  are eligible  to  apply  for  public  works
financing.  Typically,  the  projects  are  proposed  by  the  gmina  (i.e.  community-level
government).
Program  data shows that in  1994, 93 044 unemployment  participated  in the program.  Other
program data is shown  in Tables 1-7.  Table  1 provides a detailed look at the program in the
region of Poznan.  Tables 2 and 3 offer some information about participants.  Tables 4-5 look
at  expenditure  by  the  Ministry  of  Labor,  and  finally  Tables  6  and  7  compare  program
benefits, costs and outcomes.
Table  1:
Program Statistics in Pilot Region: Poznan.
Regional  Total  Regional  Average
(9 sub-regions)
1992  1993  1992  1993
Number of public  work projects  36  66  4.0  7.3
Average participant  duration  ..  ..  5.2  5.7
Average program  duration  ..  ..  6.8
Number  of participants  433  1205  48  134
% university  graduates  4  8  0.0  I
% high school leavers  34  130  4  14
% vocational  school  171  525  19  58
% basic  education'  224  542  25  66
Wages  as a share of national  average  ..  ..  59  59
Post-program  employment  (%)  ..  ..  0.0  6.1
1.  Eight years of schooling.
Source: Poznan Vovoidship Labor Office (1995). IWiojewod  ki UJrzad  Pracy w Po_ani2. Tabela:  Analiza Robot
Publicznvch Organizowanvch  Na Terenie Wojewodztwa  Poznanskiego  W Latach 1992-1993,  mimio.
44Table 2:
Duration in Public Works, 1994
Participants  %
Total'  93 044  100.0
Duration of less than 3 months  16314  17.5
Duration from 3 - 6 months  57 105  61.4
Duration of more than 6 months  19 625  21.1
Employed permanently by employer after program  3 266  3.5
1.  The number  of program  participants  was 110 493,  yet 93 044 completed  the program  in 1994.
Source: MoLSP  (May  1995), Ibid., Warsaw: MoLSP, p.17.  "Po zakonczeniu  wykonywania  robot publicznch
3.266  (3.5%)..."  Ministerswo  Pracy  i Polityki  Socjalnej  Krajowy  Urzad  Pracy  (Maj  1995). Fundusz  Pracy.
Dochody I wydatki w latach 1990-1994 ora: ocena vyykorzystania  srodkow  na aktywne  formy przeciwdzialania
be_robociu w 1994 r., Warsaw: MoLSP, p.17.
Table 3:
Participant UI Status, 1994
Participants  %
1. Total  110 493  100.0
2.  In receipt of Ul benefits pre-program  27 050  24.5
3.  No longer in receipt of UT  benefits pre-program  83 443  75.5
Proportion of (3) who subsequently qualifv for Ul benefits  55 978  67.1
Source:  MoLSP  (May  1995), Ibid.,  Warsaw:  MoLSP, p.17. "Na 83 443  bezrobotnych  nie uprawnionych  do
zasilku  w momencie  kierowania  ich do robot publicznvch,  po ich zakonczeniu  (przepracowania  minimum  6 m-
cy) uzyskalo prawo  do zasilku  55 978  (67 %) bezrobotnych."  Ministerswo  Pracy i Polityki  Socjalnej  Krajowy
Urzad  Pracy  (Maj  1995), Fundusz  Pracy:  Dochody  I wydatki w latach  1990-1994  ora- ocena  wykor-ystania




1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Ul benefits  51.1  82.0  86.3  83.9  83.8
Training  0.4  0.7  0.8  1.4  1.4
Job  Subsidies  5.7  3.3  2.1  4.3  5.5
Public Works  ..  ..  0.8  3.7  4.7
Enterprise Loans  26.0  3.0  1.0  1.7  1.2
Youth Program  13.4  8.9  7.8  4.1  2.8
Other  3.4  2.1  1.2  0.9  0.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  MoLSP (May  1995), Ibid.  Tabela NR 4. Warsaw: MoLSP, p.6.
45Table 5:
Expenditure for Active Employment Programs
(per cent)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Training  1.4  47.9  17.9  12.7  10.4
Job Subsidies  17.6  47.9  43.6  38.5  43.0
Public  Works  ..  . 16.2  33.8  36.9
Enterprise Loans  81.0  42.7  22.3  15.0  9.7
Total  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  MoLSP (May  1995), Ibid.  Tabela  NR 6, Warsaw: MoLSP., p.8.
Table  6:
Wages versus UI Benefits, 1994
%  of national
$  average wage
Maximum public works wage per month  160  75.0
Average public works wage per month  107  50.5
UI benefit per month  76  36.0
Source:  MoLSP (May  1995), Ibid., Warsaw: MoLSP, p.17.  And discussions  with Ministry.
Table 7:
Post-program Employment  Rates and
Cost per Active Employment Program',  1994
Post-program  Cost per post-program
employment  (%)  employed (S)
Training program  40.3  740
Job Subsidies  33.1  2300
Public Works  3.5  28300
1.  Calculated  using  total  program  expenditure  divided  by  number  of  participants  employed  after
program.
Source:  Tadeusz Olejarz  (July 1994), "Ranking Aktywnosci"  in Economic  Life, Warsaw, pp.32-32.
And MoLSP.
46ANNEX 6:  SPAIN
In Spain, there are three  different types of direct job  creation programs  with the objective to
create transitional employment  in public services for unskilled, unemployed  workers.  These
are:
*  Instituto Nacional de Empleo (INEM) Agreements;
*  Works of Social Utility;
*  Rural Employment Program.
The Instituto Nacional de Empleo ( or National Employment  Institute)  is a legal autonomous
entity falling  under  the authority  of the Ministry  of Labor  and  Social Security  through  the
intermediation  of the  Secretariat  General  for  Employment  and  for  Industrial  Relations.  It
implements the three direct job creation programs.
Instituto  A7acional  de Empleo  (INEM) Agreements
This program  was created  in  1985 to establish  a basis for co-operation  between  INEM and
the local authorities (provinces  and municipalities).  The objective  is to enable unemployed
workers registered  at the Employment  Office to carry out work or services of a general and
social nature through collaboration between INEM. on the one hand, and local authorities and
their administrations  on the other.
The works, which must be of public and social interest, are carried out by the local authorities
or other  local  bodies  either  with  workers hired  directly  or by  sub-contracting  with  private
enterprises.  In the former case,  75 percent of all hirings must be of former unemployed,  in
the latter case the minimum  share is 50 per cent.  The local labor offices are responsible  for
the identification  and the supervision of the projects.
47The duration of the subsidized employment  is for a minimum of one month and maximum of
one year.  The average duration of employment  is 1.8 months.  INEM Agreements  are open
to the registered unemployed threatened  with long-term unemployment.  Priority  is given to
those workers  with  the biggest  family  responsibilities.  The INEM  pays  the  Agreements'
wage costs  including  social  security contributions.  Wages paid  are generally  those set  by
collective agreement.
Works of Social Utiitj'
Introduced  in 1982, the objective of the program is to have unemployed  workers, in receipt of
benefit,  carry  out temporary  works  of  social  utility.  Participation  is  compulsory  or the
recipient may lose their unemployment  benefits.  The Ministry of Labor  and Social Security
is responsible  for  the  program.  INEM is  responsible  for the  implementation  of the work
activity.  The maximum  duration  of a  contract  is the  time  that  remains  in the  recipient's
benefit  duration.  The  program  is  open  to  all  the  reoistered  unemployed,  who  receive
unemployment  benefit  and assistance.  INEM pays the  unemployment  benefit.  The public
body, which employs the worker, pays the difference between the amount  of the benefit  and
the  scale  used  to  determine  the  contribution  to  the  social  security  contributory  system,
thereby guaranteeiiL2  the minimum national (interprofessional)  wage in operation.
Rural Employment  Pro-ram
Under the Rural Ermiplo%  ment Program, introduced  in 1983 and substantially  revised in recent
years, unemplo\ ed  \\ orklers in the Autonomous  Communities  of Andalusia  and Extremadura
are hired to work in pro iects co-financed by INEM and various levels of government  bodies.
The unemployed  workers must be registered at  the local labor office.  The wage paid to the
workers is the minimunm  wage or the wage set by collective agreement.
48Tables  1 through  4 presented below  offer information  on  participants,  their characteristics
and the types of jobs created by the programs.
Table  1:
Number of Participants
INEM Agreements  Works of Social Utility  Rural Employment
1990  209 397  8 625  173 988
1991  187 087  7 346  160 943
1992  141 265  6 207  138 294
1993  175 801  8 947  162 406
1995'  60 274  5 586  58 984
1.  Number  of participants from January-June  1995.
Source:  INEM.
Table 2:
Male Participant Characteristics,  January-June  1995
(per cent)
Age  INEM  Works of Social Utility  Rural Employment
<25  13  9  14
25 - 44  53  57  53
> 44  34  35  33
Source: Ministerio  de Trabajo  y Seguridad  social (Junio  1995), Estadistica  de
contratos registrados,  Volumen Segundo,  Table  12.1A; and MINISTERY  OF LABOUR
AND SOCIAL SECURITY/INEM  (Jan.  1995), Estadistica de contratos registrados,
Table  13.1M and Table  14.1 M.
Table 3:
Educational Level, January-June  1995
(per cent)
INEM Agreements  Works of Social Utility  Rural Employment
Illiterate  1  3  2
Primary Education  96  88  97
Secondary Education  1  2  0
Technical Qualification  1  5  1
College Degree  I  1  0
Universitv  I  I  0
Source: Ministerio  de Trabajo y Seguridad  social (Junio  1995), Estadistica  de contratos  registrados,  Volumen
Segundo. Table  12.2A, 13.2A, 14.2A.
49Table 4:
Type of Jobs Created, January-June  1995
(per cent)
INEM Agreements  Works Social Utility  Rural Employment
Agriculture  7  0  11
Industry  0  0  0
Construction  37  8  40
Public Services'  56  92  49
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad social (Junio 1995). Estadistica  de contratos registrados, Volumen
Segundo,  Table 12.4A, 13.4A, 144A.
50ANNEX 7:  UNITED KINGDOM
Community Action  was introduced  in July  1993 to help  long-term unemployed  people back
into work by providing  them with a program of structured job-search  help and with part-time
work  experience.  The  program  is  open  to  people  aged  18  and  over  who  have  been
unemployed  for  12 months  or more and have been  claiming unemployment  benefits  during
that period.
The maximum allowable  participation  duration is 6 months.  The average is approximately  4
months.  Participants  are paid  at the same rate as their previous unemployment  benefit plus
£10 per week.
Delivered  mainly  through  voluntary  and  charitable  organizations,  the  work  is designed  to
benefit  the  local  community.  General  proposals  are  formulated  by  regional  employment
offices  and local organizations  are invited to tender for  the bid.  Projects  can last up to  12
months and can be renewed.  Participants  are to receive  additional  assistance to move on to
jobs,  training  or  further  and  higher  education  from  the  Community  Action  provider  or
sponsor.
Sponsors  are  contractually  required  to  supply  standard  data  for  the  Community  Action
Leavers Information System (CALIS).  As well as supporting routine monitoring,  analysis of
CALIS  contributes  to  a wider  evaluation  of the program.  Numbers  of people  leaving the
program  and  their  average  length  of  are  monitored  monthly  by  CALIS.  Information  is
collected on the personal characteristics  of leavers and their destinations, both on leaving the
program and three months  later.  This allows program  outcomes to be measured across each
of the nine Employment  Service regions and for various categories of participant.
Program  data show that  average participation  is approximately  19 weeks.  Other  program
data,  presented  in  the  tables  below,  provide  information  on  participant  characteristics.
program  providers  and  the types  of work  being undertaken.  Also,  tables  6 and  7 provide
information on program outcomes and costs.
51Table  1:
Number of participants'
1994-1995  47 000
1995-1996  30 000
1.  The number of participants  in the program from April  1994-March  1995.
Source: Employment  Department,  Employment  Service,  data-files.
Table 2:
Previous unemployment  duration of participants,  October 1994
(per cent)
Less than 12 months  2.1
Between 12 and 23 months  49.6
Between 24 and 35 months  22.1
More than 36 months  26.2
Source:  Department  for  Education  and  Employment  (November  1995) "Community
Action: Participants,  Activity  and Outcomes",  LMOR,  Sheffield:  Department  for  Education
and Employment,  p. 14.
Table 3:
Participant  characteristics,  1994-1995'
(per cent)
Male  80
Aged 35 years or above  46
Left school aged 16 or earlier  80
No qualifications  41
No higher than a GCSE or equivalent  14
University degree  4
1.  Information  frorm CALIS based on participants who  left the program
between April  1994-March  1995.
Source:  Department  for Education  and Employment  (November  1995)
"Community  Action: Participants,  Activity  and Outcomes",  LMOR, Sheffield:





Private sector  15
Local authority  8
Other public  sector  3
Other  3
1.  Information  from CALIS based on participants who left the program  between April
1994-March  1995.
Source:  Department for Education and  Employment (November 1995) "Community
Action:  Participants, Activity  and  Outcomes".  LMQR,  Sheffield:  Department  for
Education  and Employment,  p.14.
Table 5:
Tvpe of work activity, 1994-1995'
(per cent)
Male  Female
Environmental/Conservation  37  12
Community  Improvements  27  6
Social  Services  15  33
Administration  4  14
Other 2 17  34
1.  Information from CALIS based on participants who left the program  between April 1994-
March 1995.
2.  This category is primarily  made up of participants  involved in retail activity in charity shops.
Source: Department for Education  and Employment  (November 1995)  Community Action:
Participants, Activity  and  Outcomes",  LMOR.  Sheffield:  Department  for  Education and
Employment,  p.14.
Table 6:
Post-program outcomes at 3 months, 1994-95'
(per cent)
Male  Female  Total
Full-time  employment  9.3  9.2  9.3
Part-time  employment  2.9  9.5  4.4
Self-employment  0.9  0.3  0.8
Other  positive  outcomes 2 12.7  14.4  13.1
Unemployed  74.2  66.6  72.5
1.  Information from CALIS based on participants who left the program  between April 1994-
March 1995 and their activities  3 months after leaving the program.
2.  Positive outcomes refer to those in full-time  education  or training.
Source: Department  for Education  and Employment  (November 1995) "Community Action:
Participants.  Activity and Outcomes", LMOR,  Sheffield:  Department for Education  and
Employment,  p.14.
53Table 7:
Scale and cost of employment  and training programs,  1994-95
Principle  employment  and  Total  Number  of  Cost per
training program  Expenditure  participants  participant
$'OOOs  'OOOs  $
Jobclubs  6660  257  260
Jobplan  37200  250  150
Restart  courses  19400  144  130
Training  for Work  1061000  276  3840
Community  Action  151000  47  3210
Source: Column 2:  Employment  Service (1996) Annual Report and Accounts 1994-95,  London, HMSO,
p.46;  "Training for Work" data taken from Department of  Education and Employment  (March 1996)
Departmental  Report, London.  HMSO, p. 108.
54ANNEX 8:  UNITED STATES
PSE programs enacted under the Comprehensive  Employment  and Training  Act (CETA) can
be divided  into 2 sub-programs:  a job  creation program  to  absorb  cyclical unemployment,
another to diminish  structural unemployment.  Both types  of programs  had the  objective to
provide needed public services.
Structural  Unemployment Program  (PSE  Title II).  Title  II programs,  introduced  in  1973.
were  initially  designed  to  counteract  structural  unemployment.  They  were  targeted
geographically and operated only in areas of high unemployment,  defined as unemployment
of  6.5  percent  or  more.  In  addition,  the  programs  were  targeted  at  those  having  been
unemployed  for at least 30 days or under-employed.  The under-employed  were those who
had  been  working  part time  involuntarily  or  earning  below  poverty-level  wages.  Other
segments  of the  population  that  were  targeted  were  the  long  term  unemployed,  Vietnam
veterans.  AFDC recipients, and former  employment  and training program  participants.  The
program also emphasized that jobs be created "needed public services".
With  the  re-re-authorization  of  CETA  in  1978, the  purpose  of  Title  II  was  amended  to
include training and related services.  Eligibility was tightened  considerably to require that an
individual be economically disadvantaged  and unemployed  for 15 of the prior 20 weeks or be
a member  of a family that was receiving  public  assistance.  "Economically  disadvantaged"
meant  a family income less than  or equal  to 70 percent  of the BLS  lower  living  standard.
Formal  training  for  participants  became  important.  Helping  state  and  local  government
provide services were no longer one of the objectives.
Initially,  there was no  limit on the  duration  of participation.  Local  and  state governments
were  required  to  pay  wages  comparable  to  unsubsidized  workers  in  similar  jobs.  A
maximum  wage  of  $10,000  was  set,  along  with  a  recommendation  from  the  national
government to keep the average wage to $7,800.  There was no limit  on the extent to which
state or local governments  could supplement  the wage.  Nor was there a limit on the tvpes of
jobs  into which  participant  could  be placed:  the  suggested  types  of jobs  included  all  the
functions of local and state government.
55However, in 1978 program duration was limited to a maximum  of 18 months in any five-year
period.  Department  of  Labor  could  grant  waivers  for  up  to  12  months  over  limit  to
jurisdictions  with at least 7 percent unemployment  rate and difficulty  in shifting participants
to  unsubsidized  jobs.  Wages  were  set  at  a  maximum  $10,000  with  an  adjustment  up  to
$12,000 for high-wage  areas.  Local  supplements  of wage levels  were no longer permitted.
The jobs  provided  were  to  be  entry  level,  combined  with  training  and  support  services.
Project jobs were not required  to be entry level.
Initially, no less than 90 percent of the funds were to be used for wages; the remaining  funds
were  to  be  used  for  administration,  training,  and  supportive  services.  Given  the  small
percentage  of  funds  involved,  administration  took  precedence  over  training.  Informal
training did not count.  However,  1978 legislation  required that ten percent of the funds were
to be used for training  in fiscal year  1979,  15 percent in fiscal year  1980, and 20 percent in
fiscal year 1981.
Cyclical  Unemployment  Program  (PSE  Title VI).  Title IV programs  were meant to absorb
cyclical unemployment  and, like Title II programs,  also emphasized jobs  creation in "needed
public services".  To be eligible,  participants  had  to have been  unemployed  for  at least 30
days or be under-employed.  If they  lived  in an  area of excess  unemployment  (having  an
unemployment  rate  of  7  percent  for  three  consecutive  months),  they  had  to  have  been
unemployed  for  15  days.  Special  attention  was  to  be  given  to  persons  who  had  been
unemployed  for  15 weeks  or more, those  who  had exhausted  their unemployment  benefits,
and those who were unemployed but not eligible  for unemployment  benefits.
In 1976, eligibility  requirements  changed.  Program  participants had to have a family income
in the preceding  three months  that was at or below  70 percent  of the lower  living standard,
and be unemployed for  15 weeks or have exhausted  their unemployment  benefits or being in
a family that was receiving  AFDC benefits.  Or, in another Title VI stream, participants must
be unemployed 30 days before application  (15 days in areas of high unemployment).
In 1978, eligibility requirements  changed again.  Participants must be unemployed at time of
determination  and  for  at  least  10 of the  previous  12 weeks,  and  have  low income.  The
purpose  of the program  was  now to  provide jobs  for 20  percent  of the unemployed  if the
56national  unemployment  rates  was more than 4 percent.  If the national unemployment  rates
was  in excess  of 7 percent,  the  program  was to  employ  25  percent of the unemployed  in
excess of 4 percent of the labor force.  the provision of public services was no longer a stated
purpose of Title VI.
Initially, there was no limit on the duration of participation.  The 1976 legislation  introduced
the requirement  that participants  were  to be employed  in projects  of a one-time  nature that
had  a  duration  of  12 months  or less.  No  individual  limit  on  program  participation.  In
addition, a substantial portion  of these jobs were to be in non-profit  organizations.  State and
local governments were required to pay wages comparable to unsubsidized workers in similar
jobs.  A maximum wage of S10,000 was set, along with an average wage of $7,800.  Nor was
there a limit on the types of jobs into which participant  could be placed:  the suggested types
of jobs included all the functions  of local and state government.
The 1978 reforms placed more restrictions  on the types of jobs  created.  Half of the jobs were
to be entry-level  public  service jobs.  The other half were to be in projects  with  a planned
duration  of 18 months or less.  One-third of the funds was to be used to support jobs  in the
non-profit sector.  Program duration was limited to a maximum of 18 months in any five-year
period.  Department  of  Labor  may  grant  waivers  for  up  to  12  months  over  limit  to
jurisdictions  with at least 7 percent unemployment  rate and difficulty in shifting participants
to  unsubsidized  jobs.  Wages  were  set at  a  maximum  $10,000  with  an  adjustment  up  to
$12,000 for high-wage  areas.  Local  supplements  of wage levels were no  longer permitted.
The jobs  provided  were  to  be  entry  level,  combined  with  training  and  support  services.
Project jobs were not required to be entry level.
Initially, ninety percent of the funds were to be used for wages and benefits.  The remaining
10 percent included administration,  leaving little for training and support services.  State and
local governments  were to place 50 percent of their participants  but this was only a goal and
waivers were readily  accepted.  In 1976, eighty-five percent of the funds were to be used for
wages and benefits, the rest being used for administration.  There was no rule that agents set
aside any share of the funds for training or support  services.  In 1978, at least 5 percent of the
funds  were  allocated  for  training  and  counseling.  In addition,  sponsors  were  to  prepare
57employability  development  plans  for participants  and  specify  in their plans  the placement
rates that thev hoped to achieve.
Find below  several tables  which  describe the program participants,  the type  of work which
was undertaken and some information on program expenditure.
Table 1:
Number of Program Participants
(annual new enrollments)
Title  II  Title VI
1972  226 000
1973  180  000  N/A
1974  269 000  N/A
1975  227 000  157  000
1976  116  000  372 000
1977  372 000  441000
1978  107  000  556 000
1979  460 000  791 000
1980  348 000  346 000
1981  118  000  118  000
1.  Enrolments  in Title II and VI in Januarv  of each year.
Source: US Department of Labor (various  years) Employment  and




1975  1978'  1980
Men  70  62  55
Women  30  38  45
Under  22  23  23  25
22-44  61  65  64
45 and over  16  12  12
Education  (Grade)  0-8  10  11  9
9-l1  14  26  23
12  42  50  42
13  34  14  26
Economically disadvantaged  37  832  88-
Receiving public assistance  10  62  40
1.  1978 project participants.
2.  Receiving  cash welfare  and/or  below  70 percent  of BLS  lower  living standard  and/or below
OMB poverty  level income.
Source:  COOK.  R. et al (1985). IBID. Table 2-1. p. 35.
58Table  3:
Types  of Services Provided  by PSE  Enrolees
PEP2  December  1 9 7 7 b  December  197 9b
Characteristic  1971-72  Sustainment  Project  II-D  VI
Primary service  41  58  45  25  42
Protective  17  19  1  6  11
Public Works  19  1  l  16  9  19
Environmental quality  5  16  19  3  5
General administration  (3)  12  9  7  7
Social services  15  19  25  35  33
Social services  7  10  16  24  21
Health  8  6  7  7  7
Cultural  N.A.  3  .2  4  5
Parks and recreation  9  17  15  5  8
Education  19  6  6  34  14
Miscellaneous  12  1  8  1  3
Total  100  100  100  100  100
Source:  COOK.  R. et al (1985). IBID, Table 2-2. Types of Services Provided by PSE Enrollees,  p. 38.
Table 4:
Distribution  of Participants  by Employer  and  Program
(per  cent)
Title  Sample  Other local  School  Federal and  Nonprofit
Governments  governments  districts  state agencies  orgs.
II and IV -sustainment ([X)  I 07)  65  6  14  4  10
VI-project  (Dec  19771  35  6  12  4  43
Overall average (Dec I1)T i  52  6  13  4  25
11-D  (Dec 1979)  34  11  22  2  31
VI  (Dec 1979)  55  4  6  4  31
Overall average (Dec 14-Q)  44  7  15  3  31
II-D (Dec 1980  33  11  22  3  31
VI(Dec  1980)  47  2  7  4  39
Overall average (Dec  10'1  39  8  16  3  34
Source:  COOK.  R  et  ( !985).  IBID. Table  2-3:  Percentage  Distribution  of PSE  Participants  by Title  and
Employing  Agenc\  ?  "
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Distribution of Employment Effects by Employing  Agency, Dec. 1979
(per cent)
Effect  Sample  Other local  School  State and  Nonprofit
governments  governments  districts  federal gov't  orgs
Net job  creation  80  87  86  90  93
New programs and services  6  1  8  10  26
Expansion of programs  21  70  22  60  39
Special projects  5  8  1  15  12
Program maintenance  48  8  54  5  16
Job displacement  20  13  14  10  7
Source:  COOK. R. et al (1985), Public Service Employment:  The Experience of a Decade,  Table 3-3:
Percentage  Distribution  of Employment  Effects  by Employing  Agency,  W.E.Upjohn  Institute  for Employment
Research,  Kalamazoo,  Michigan,  p.65.
Table 6:  Program Expenditure
(millions of S)
Title II  Title IV
1972  962
1973  1 239
1974'  281
1975  668  872
1976  1 624  666
1977'  1 293  6 000
1978  347  1 861
1979  2 462  3 317
1980  1 503  1  660
1981  1 308  1 308
1.  CETA was initiated  in July 1974 (i.e. fiscal year  1975).
2.  Includes Transitional  Quarter,  I July to 30 September  1976.
Source:  US Department  of Labor (various  years) Employment  and
Training  Report of the President,  Table F-I.
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